Gains, Losses, and Judges: Framing and the Judiciary by Rachlinski, Jeffrey J & Wistrich, Andrew J
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 94 | Issue 2 Article 2
1-2019





United States District Court for the Central District of California
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Courts Commons, and the Judges Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Notre Dame Law Review at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre
Dame Law Review by an authorized editor of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
94 Notre Dame L. Rev. 521 (2019).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-2\NDL202.txt unknown Seq: 1 27-DEC-18 9:19
GAINS,  LOSSES,  AND  JUDGES:
FRAMING  AND  THE  JUDICIARY
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski* & Andrew J. Wistrich**
Losses hurt more than foregone gains—an asymmetry that psychologists call “loss aver-
sion.”  Losses cause more regret than foregone gains, and people struggle harder to avoid losses
than to obtain equivalent gains.  Loss aversion produces a variety of anomalous behaviors:
people’s preferences depend upon the initial reference point (reference-dependent choice); people
are overly focused on maintaining the status quo (status quo bias); people attach more value to
goods they own than to identical goods that they do not (endowment effect); and people take
excessive risks to avoid sure losses (risk seeking in the face of losses).  These phenomena are so
pervasive that legal scholars have assumed that they influence the development of law.  Although
numerous studies reveal that framing influences how ordinary people think about their rights, a
clear demonstration that judges decide cases differently when the underlying facts present gains
as opposed to losses does not exist.  This Article fills that gap.  We present eight studies with over
one thousand judges as research participants that demonstrate that all four of these anomalous
features of framing influence how sitting judges evaluate legal cases.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you bet a friend from Philadelphia $50 that the New
England Patriots would win Super Bowl LII.  Philadelphia won.  How would
you best express the financial implications of the game for you?  Perhaps the
most natural way is that you “lost $50.”  That is true enough, but is incom-
plete.  You are really $100 worse off.  You had to pay your friend $50, and you
did not win the $50 that your friend would have paid you had New England
won.  The salient out-of-pocket loss overshadows the $50 that you did not
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win.1  Losing is not identical to failing to win.2  Losses hurt much more than
equivalent gains feel good, and we thus focus our attention on losses.3
Aversion to losses is one of the most robust phenomena in the pantheon
of decision theory and behavioral economics.4  It even has a neurological
basis.5  Loss aversion clearly influences decisions about financial gambles but
extends well beyond that.6  Doctors favor riskier medical procedures
described as involving the potential loss of life than described as potentially
lifesaving;7 or, as a popular television show put it: “She can actually make a
side effect like 10% chance of liver failure sound like a 90% chance of liver
1 See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under
Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 279 (1979) [hereinafter Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory]
(“The aggravation that one experiences in losing a sum of money appears to be greater
than the pleasure associated with gaining the same amount.”).
2 See id. at 274 (“[P]eople normally perceive outcomes as gains and losses, rather than
as final states of wealth or welfare.”); see also Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices,
Values, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 342 (1984) [hereinafter Kahneman & Tver-
sky, Choices, Values, and Frames] (“[T]he psychophysical analysis of outcomes should be
applied to gains and losses rather than to total assets.”); Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. BUS. S251, S259 (1986) [here-
inafter Tversky & Kahneman, Rational Choice] (“[T]he effective carriers of values are gains
and losses . . . .”).
3 See Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory, supra note 1, at 279 (“[L]osses loom larger
than gains.”); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-
Dependent Model, 106 Q.J. ECON. 1039, 1040 (1991) [hereinafter Tversky & Kahneman, Loss
Aversion] (“[T]he impact of a difference on a dimension is generally greater when that
difference is evaluated as a loss than when the same difference is evaluated as a gain.”);
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211
SCIENCE 453, 454 (1981) [hereinafter Tversky & Kahneman, Framing of Decisions] (“[T]he
response to losses is more extreme than the response to gains.”).
4 See Irwin P. Levin et al., All Frames Are Not Created Equal: A Typology and Critical
Analysis of Framing Effects, 76 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 149, 150
(1998) (“[S]tudies of ‘framing effects’ in the area of human judgment and decision-mak-
ing have proliferated . . . .”); see also Adelson Pin˜on & Hilda Gambara, A Meta-Analytic
Review of Framing Effect: Risky, Attribute and Goal Framing, 17 PSICOTHEMA 325 (2005) (review-
ing the large literature on framing).
5 See Benedetto De Martino et al., Frames, Biases, and Rational Decision-Making in the
Human Brain, 313 SCIENCE 684 (2006) (reporting that fMRI scans showed that the framing
effect was associated with amygdala activity, while orbital and prefrontal cortex activity was
associated with reduced susceptibility to the framing effect); Patrick Ring, The Framing
Effect and Skin Conductance Responses, 9 FRONTIER BEHAV. NEUROSCIENCE 188 (2015) (“Under
negative frames, participants show significantly higher ISCRS [a measure of emotional
arousal] while waiting for an electric shock to be delivered than under positive frames.”).
6 See Nathan Novemsky & Daniel Kahneman, The Boundaries of Loss Aversion, 42 J.
MARKETING RES. 119, 119 (2005) (“Although loss aversion was originally studied with
respect to choices between two-outcome monetary gambles, researchers soon identified
loss aversion in many contexts . . . .”); Tversky & Kahneman, Rational Choice, supra note 2,
at S268 (asserting that the phenomena they attribute to loss aversion “are not restricted to
monetary outcomes”).
7 See Barbara J. McNeil et al., On the Elicitation of Preferences for Alternative Therapies, 306
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1259 (1982).
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success!”8  Professional golfers take more chances to avoid a bogey than to
obtain a par.9  People report that food tastes better when described as 75%
lean than as having a 25% fat content.10  Successful political candidates—
including then-candidate Donald Trump—take care to use the rhetoric of
loss to instill a desire for change.11  People have different physiological reac-
tions to gains than to losses.12  Nonhuman primate species such as chimpan-
zees13 and capuchin monkeys share the same asymmetric response to gains
and losses.14
Most choices can be described (or “framed”) as involving either a loss or
a gain.  The malleability of choices then creates anomalies of judgment,
including reference-dependent choices, the endowment effect, the status
quo bias, and risk-seeking choices when confronting losses.15  Loss aversion
(or framing), as psychologists dubbed this phenomenon,16 makes the frame
of reference relevant to choice in that preferences seem to depend upon the
position people currently occupy (reference-dependent choice).17  It also
leads to a preference for the status quo (status quo bias).18  Loss aversion
induces people to value commodities more once they own them (the endow-
ment effect).19  Finally, when all of the potential options involve losses, an
aversion to sure losses leads to risk-seeking conduct; people choose options
8 The Big Bang Theory: The Cognition Regeneration (CBS television broadcast Apr. 27,
2017).
9 See Devin G. Pope & Maurice E. Schweitzer, Is Tiger Woods Loss Averse? Persistent Bias
in the Face of Experience, Competition, and High Stakes, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 129, 136 (2011).
10 See Irwin P. Levin & Gary J. Gaeth, How Consumers Are Affected by the Framing of Attri-
bute Information Before and After Consuming the Product, 15 J. CONSUMER RES. 374 (1988).
11 See James Surowiecki, Losers!, NEW YORKER (June 6 & 13, 2016), https://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/06/06/losers-for-trump (describing candidate
Trump’s emphasis on the rhetoric of “losing” during his campaign for President, quoting
him as constantly asserting America was “losing our jobs” to illegal immigrants or as a result
of trade deals and at one point saying, “[w]e’re losing everything”).
12 See Guy Hochman & Eldad Yechiam, Loss Aversion in the Eye and in the Heart: The
Autonomic Nervous System’s Responses to Losses, 24 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 140 (2011)
(describing this research).  The brain seems to process losses differently from gains as well.
See Benedetto De Martino et al., Amygdala Damage Eliminates Monetary Loss Aversion, 107
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 3788 (2010).
13 See Sarah F. Brosnan et al., Endowment Effects in Chimpanzees, 17 CURRENT BIOLOGY
1704 (2007).
14 See Venkat R. Lakshminarayanan et al., The Evolution of Decision-Making Under Risk:
Framing Effects in Monkey Risk Preferences, 47 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 689 (2011).
15 See Tversky & Kahneman, Loss Aversion, supra note 3, at 1041–45 (connecting these
phenomena to loss aversion).
16 Id. at 1039 (defining “loss aversion”).
17 See id. at 1046–48 (describing a formal model of reference-dependent choice that
includes loss aversion).
18 See Kahneman & Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, supra note 2, at 348 (“[L]oss
aversion favors stability over change.”).
19 See Tversky & Kahneman, Loss Aversion, supra note 3, at 1041 (“An immediate conse-
quence of loss aversion is that the loss of utility associated with giving up a valued good is
greater than the utility gain associated with receiving it.”).
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that hold out hope of losing as little as possible, even when those options are
economically less attractive than options that involve sure options (risk-seek-
ing choices when confronting losses).20
Not surprisingly, a phenomenon as robust as loss aversion influences the
development of law.21  The distinction between gains and losses appears to
be deeply embedded in the grammar of how people think, including about
law.22  For example, tort law concerns itself with the “loss of a chance” rather
than a “foregone opportunity.”23  The Constitution protects against “takings”
but provides no discussion of “givings” or failures to give.24  Professor Patrick
Atiyah asserts the intuition clearly: “To deprive somebody of something
which he merely expects to receive is a less serious wrong, deserving less pro-
tection, than to deprive somebody of the expectation of continuing to hold
something which he already possesses.”25  The effect of loss aversion on law
and public policy is thus apt to be powerful.  Just consider the following
examples of the role framing plays in a variety of legal contexts:
1.  Although the Supreme Court interprets constitutionally enshrined feder-
alism as precluding the federal government from imposing penalties (losses)
on states for failing to enact legislation,26 federal statutes that withhold fed-
eral highway funds (foregone gains) for failing to enact legislation are con-
stitutionally acceptable.27
2.  A New York statute, recently challenged on First Amendment grounds
before the United States Supreme Court, Expressions Hair Design v. Schneider-
20 See Kahneman & Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, supra note 2, at 342 (“Risk
seeking in the domain of losses has been confirmed by several investigators.”); Kahneman
& Tversky, Prospect Theory, supra note 1, at 268–69 (describing a “risk seeking preference
for a loss that is merely probable over a smaller loss that is certain”); id. at 269 (“[T]he
overweighting of certainty . . . favors . . . risk seeking in the domain of losses.”); Tversky &
Kahneman, Framing of Decisions, supra note 3, at 453 (documenting a shift from “risk aver-
sion to risk taking” when confronting choices involving losses).
21 See David Cohen & Jack L. Knetsch, Judicial Choice and Disparities Between Measures of
Economic Values, 30 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 737, 749 (1992) (“[A] phenomenon as pervasive as
[loss aversion] would be expected to be implicated, either explicitly or implicitly, in the
development of legal doctrine.”).
22 See id. at 741–42.
23 See David A. Fischer, Tort Recovery for Loss of a Chance, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 605,
607–17 (2001) (describing the doctrine).
24 “The Fifth Amendment bars only uncompensated takings; there is no ‘Givings
Clause.’” Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547, 551 (2001)
(footnote omitted).
25 P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 428 (1979).
26 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (invalidating a federal statute that
imposed a requirement that states either open a disposal facility for low-level radioactive
waste or take title to all such waste in the state on the grounds that the statute “comman-
deer[ed]” state legislatures).
27 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (upholding a federal statute that with-
held a portion of federal highway funds to any state that did not increase its legal drinking
age to twenty-one).
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man, forbids the use of surcharges (losses) on credit card transactions, but
allows discounts for cash (gains).28
3.  The Clean Air Act29 regulates new sources of air pollution (which can
reduce potential profits or gains of future facilities) far more aggressively
than existing sources (which would impose losses on existing facilities).30
4.  Defendants in lawsuits commonly reject economically favorable settle-
ment offers (which would mean incurring a loss) in favor of litigating vigor-
ously, while plaintiffs generally accept such settlement offers (which means
accepting a smaller gain than an aggressive litigation strategy might
bring).31
5.  Tort law compensates victims for all manner of out-of-pocket losses, but
fails to provide compensation for foregone profits in most settings.32  Simi-
larly, “when an interaction results in both an injury to one side and benefit
28 Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144 (2017) (referring to N.Y.
GEN. BUS. LAW § 518 (McKinney 2018)).  The Court remanded the case back to the New
York courts for clarification on the meaning of the statute. Id. at 1151; see also Italian
Colors Rest. v. Becerra, 878 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that California Civil Code
section 1748.1(a), which “prohibits retailers from imposing a surcharge on customers who
make payments with credit cards, but permits discounts for payments by cash or other
means,” violates the First Amendment rights of retailer plaintiffs; and stating that
“[a]lthough mathematically equivalent, surcharges may be more effective than discounts
because the frame within which information is presented can significantly alter one’s per-
ception of that information, especially when one can perceive information as a gain or a
loss”  and “research has shown that economic actors are more likely to change their behav-
ior if they are presented with a potential loss than with a potential gain” (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
29 Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963) (codified as amended at scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.).
30 For reviews of grandfathering in the Clean Air Act, see Jonathan Remy Nash &
Richard L. Revesz, Grandfathering and Environmental Regulation: The Law and Economics of
New Source Review, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1677, 1681–707 (2007); Heidi Gorovitz Robertson, If
Your Grandfather Could Pollute, So Can You: Environmental “Grandfather Clauses” and Their Role
in Environmental Inequity, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 131, 152–58 (1995); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 253 (1997) (“Government regulation of new risks will
predictably be more stringent than government regulation of (equivalent) old risks.  This
is so precisely because the public demand for regulation will be a product of status quo
bias.”); Jack L. Knetsch, Environmental Policy Implications of Disparities Between Willingness to
Pay and Compensation Demanded Measures of Values, 18 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 227, 235
(1990) (“Implementing new pollution controls that force current waste dischargers to
reduce outflows may also widely be seen as imposing losses on polluters for the benefit of
neighbors.  This perception of losses being visited on particular individuals could give rise
to a negative reaction . . . .”).
31 See RANDALL KISER, BEYOND RIGHT AND WRONG: THE POWER OF EFFECTIVE DECISION
MAKING FOR ATTORNEYS AND CLIENTS 29–86 (2010) (reviewing evidence of framing effects
in settlement decisions); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation,
70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113, 149–60 (1996) (same).
32 See Cohen & Knetsch, supra note 21, at 753–56.
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to the other, the remedial rights of the injured party are usually based on
her losses, rather than on the other party’s gains.”33
6.  Taxpayers who have underpaid during the year and face paying more
taxes when they file their return are much more likely to file fraudulent
returns than those who have overpaid during the year and are already get-
ting a rebate.34
7.  The Supreme Court interprets the Due Process Clause as requiring a
hearing before a beneficiary of an entitlements program can be deprived of
any benefits (a loss); fully qualified applicants for benefits (future gain) do
not enjoy the same protection.35
8.  Employees rarely attempt to bargain for more employment protection
than “at will” employment offers (a potential gain), but employees who have
“for cause” protection strongly resist giving it up (a potential loss).36
The list of legal issues in which foregone gains and losses are treated differ-
ently goes on at length.37  Over a decade ago, two articles reviewing the liter-
ature on the implications of framing for the legal system identified hundreds
of law review articles on the subject.38  A recent book expands even further
on this list.39
The influence of loss aversion on legislative and regulatory processes
appears to be well established,40 but judges obviously play a critical role in
the development of law.  As outside referees, however, judges might not fall
33 EYAL ZAMIR, LAW, PSYCHOLOGY & MORALITY: THE ROLE OF LOSS AVERSION 121 (2015).
34 See Henry S.J. Robben et al., Decision Frame and Opportunity as Determinants of Tax
Cheating: An International Experimental Study, 11 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 341, 344–46 (1990)
(reviewing evidence of framing in tax compliance).
35 See William Van Alstyne, Cracks in “The New Property”: Adjudicative Due Process in the
Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445, 449–51 (1977) (identifying the failure of the
courts to recognize the rights of applicants to due process protection).  To be sure, this
distinction might involve more than just framing.  Someone who is already receiving enti-
tlement program benefits has not just stumbled across them by chance.  Rather he or she
probably already has been found to be entitled to them.  A mere applicant for the same
benefits is not in the same position.  That person’s entitlement to the benefits has not been
preliminarily or presumptively settled.
36 See Cass R. Sunstein, Human Behavior and the Law of Work, 87 VA. L. REV. 205, 221
(2001) (“[I]f for-cause protection is initially given to the employee, it is reasonable to pre-
dict that the employee will demand more to relinquish job security than he would be will-
ing to pay to obtain the right in the first instance.”).
37 See Chris Guthrie, Prospect Theory, Risk Preference, and the Law, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1115,
1120 (2003) (“[P]rospect theory is applicable to every area of the law.”).  For an extensive
review of loss aversion in law, see ZAMIR, supra note 33.
38 See Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV.
1227, 1229 (2003) (“As of January 2003, 373 law journal articles had mentioned either the
endowment effect or the status quo bias . . . .”); see also Guthrie, supra note 37 (citing
numerous other studies of framing).
39 ZAMIR, supra note 33.
40 See Korobkin, supra note 38, at 1266–69 (describing the influence of loss aversion
on the regulatory and legislative processes).
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prey to the cognitive illusions that influence lay citizens and litigants.  The
many articles assessing the role of framing in legal analysis still lack a system-
atic demonstration that framing influences judicial decisions.  The research
presented in this Article fills that gap.
In this Article, we present eight studies in which over one thousand
judges evaluated hypothetical cases from the perspective of either gains or
losses.  In all eight studies, we used fact patterns presenting decisions that are
factually and economically identical except for their frame as a gain or loss,
illustrating the four phenomena described above (reference-dependent
choice, status quo bias, endowment effect, and risk-seeking choices in the
face of losses).41  Across eight different areas of law, judges reacted differ-
ently to gains than to losses.  In short, the results confirmed one of the basic
insights of behavioral economics by demonstrating that gains and losses
affect how judges decide cases.
This Article proceeds as follows.  In Part I, we briefly review the literature
on framing effects, with special attention to applications in legal contexts.  In
Part, II we describe our research methods.  In Part III, we describe the eight
studies of framing we have conducted on judges and report our results.  Part
IV offers a discussion and conclusions.
I. FRAMING, WITH APPLICATIONS TO LAW
As journalist Michael Lewis documented in his recent book, The Undoing
Project, psychologists Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman first documented
the disparity between people’s reactions to gains and losses while studying
economic paradoxes concerning how people make choices involving risk.42
All of the decisions Tversky and Kahneman initially studied involved poten-
tial gains.  For example, they asked their research subjects questions like:
“Would you rather have $500 for sure or a 50–50 shot at $1,000?”43  Tversky
began to wonder what would happen if they began putting negative signs in
front of the numbers.44  For example: “Which . . . do you prefer . . . [a]
lottery ticket that offers a 50 percent chance of losing $1,000 [or a] certain
loss of $500[?]”45  When their subjects chose among gains, they preferred
41 We have eschewed alternative divisions of framing into the categories of attribute
framing, risky choice framing, and goal framing. See, e.g., Levin et al., supra note 4 (divid-
ing framing into attribute, risky choice, and goal).  Nevertheless, our Article includes
experiments falling into each of those categories.
42 MICHAEL LEWIS, THE UNDOING PROJECT 268–69 (2017).
43 Id. at 268 (emphasis omitted).
44 Id.; see also Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory, supra note 1, at 268 (asking
“[w]hat happens when the signs of the outcomes are reversed so that gains are replaced by
losses?”).
45 LEWIS, supra note 42, at 268 (emphasis omitted); see also Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty, 5 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 297, 307–08 (1992) [hereinafter Tversky & Kahneman, Advances in Prospect
Theory] (reporting that people make risk-seeking choices across a wide range of different
stakes when facing losses).
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certainty, and when they chose among losses, they preferred risk.46  This
research led Tversky and Kahneman to conclude that the disparity between
gains and losses “reflects a general property of the human organism as a plea-
sure machine.  For most people, the happiness involved in receiving a desira-
ble object is smaller than the unhappiness involved in losing the same
object.”47  A series of research papers by Tversky and Kahneman docu-
mented a wide disparity between how people think about gains and how peo-
ple think about losses, which they ultimately termed “framing.”48
Much of the disparity between gains and losses can best be characterized
as an aversion to losses.49  “[L]osses (outcomes below the reference state)
loom larger than corresponding gains (outcomes above the reference
state).”50  Loss aversion explains such oddities of human choice as the wide-
spread unwillingness to bet on a coin flip—the potential loss outweighs the
potential gain.51  Put another way, “[t]he displeasure associated with losing a
sum of money is generally greater than the pleasure associated with winning
the same amount.”52  In fact, the hedonic pain of a loss is twice as much as
the hedonic pleasure from an economically identical gain.53  Loss aversion
and framing produce several phenomena of judgment and choice including
reference-dependent choices, status quo bias, the endowment effect, and
risk-seeking preferences in the face of losses.54
A. Reference-Dependent Choices
Loss aversion, almost by definition, implies a reference dependence in
human choices.55  “[P]eople normally perceive outcomes as gains and losses,
rather than as final states of wealth or welfare.”56  A gain can only be a gain
46 See Amos Tversky et al., The Causes of Preference Reversal, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 204, 215
(1990) (“[A]lternative framings of the same options (for example, in terms or gains vs.
losses, or in terms of survival vs. mortality) produce inconsistent preferences . . . .”).
47 LEWIS, supra note 42, at 269–70 (quoting Tversky and Kahneman).
48 Kahneman & Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, supra note 2; Kahneman & Tver-
sky, Prospect Theory, supra note 1; Tversky & Kahneman, Framing of Decisions, supra note 3;
Tversky & Kahneman, Loss Aversion, supra note 3.
49 See Tversky & Kahneman, Loss Aversion, supra note 3, at 1047.
50 Id.
51 Kahneman & Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, supra note 2, at 342 (“[M]ost
respondents in a sample of undergrads refused to stake $10 on the toss of a coin if they
stood to win less than $30.”).
52 Tversky & Kahneman, Framing of Decisions, supra note 3, at 454.
53 See Chip Heath et al., Goals as Reference Points, 38 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 79, 87 (1999)
(“Studies of risky choice and riskless choice have presented converging evidence that losses
are weighted approximately two times more than equivalent gains.” (citations omitted)).
54 See Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory, supra note 1, at 268–69 (connecting an
effort to avoid certain losses to risk-seeking choices); Tversky & Kahneman, Loss Aversion,
supra note 3, at 1047 (describing reference-dependent choice, status quo bias, and the
endowment effect as products of loss aversion).
55 Tversky & Kahneman, Loss Aversion, supra note 3, at 1045.
56 Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory, supra note 1, at 274.
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relative to a reference point and the same for a loss.  A change in a reference
point can thus alter choice, even if the change in reference point is often
arbitrary.57
The point is perhaps best illustrated with a pair of hypothetical questions
developed by Tversky and Kahneman which they describe as illustrating psy-
chological accounting.58
1.  “Imagine that you have decided to see a play where admission is $10 per
ticket.  As you enter the theater you discover that you have lost a $10 bill.
Would you still pay $10 for a ticket for the play?”
2.  “Imagine that you have decided to see a play and paid the admission
price of $10 per ticket.  As you enter the theater you discover that you have
lost the ticket. . . .  Would you pay $10 for another ticket?”59
Most people answer Question 1 in the affirmative, but most people answer
Question 2 in the negative.60  Both questions are, as matter of simple eco-
nomics, identical.  The loss of the $10 bill is unconnected to the play, so it
does not have much influence on choice, but the second question makes the
play seem like it costs $20 to attend.61  Because that is $10 more than the cost
of a ticket, it feels like a loss relative to the expected price.  In effect, the
reference point for valuing the play differs between the two questions.
The influence of reference points on decisionmaking is not confined to
abstract gambles in the laboratory—it affects real-world decisions as well.  In
one demonstration, a group of distinguished economists convinced a school
district to experiment with loss aversion to incentivize teachers.62  The dis-
trict created an incentive system in which those teachers who produced spe-
cific, noticeable improvements in grade-school (kindergarten through eighth
grade) students’ math scores would receive an extra eight percent in salary.
This incentive system had little effect on test scores.63  The result, though
puzzling for economists, was consistent with numerous previous studies on
the impact of teacher incentives on student performance.64  When the
researchers offered an alternative program in which the teachers received
the bonus at the beginning of the year, but had to refund it if they did not
produce the same improvements in test scores, however, test scores improved
57 Tversky & Kahneman, Framing of Decisions, supra note 3, at 453 (“The frame that a
decision-maker adopts is controlled partly by the formulation of the problem.”).




62 Roland G. Fryer, Jr. et al., Enhancing the Efficacy of Teacher Incentives Through Loss
Aversion: A Field Experiment (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18237,
2012).
63 Id. at 3 (“In line with previous studies in the United States, we do not find an impact
of teacher incentives that are framed as gains.”).
64 See Roland G. Fryer, Teacher Incentives and Student Achievement: Evidence from New York
City Public Schools, 31 J. LAB. ECON. 373 (2013).
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dramatically.65  The potential loss of the bonus had a much bigger effect on
performance than the potential gain of the same bonus.  Other studies also
show that workers are much more highly motivated by the prospect of com-
pensation that falls below their expectations than by the potential for
bonuses.66  People are also more likely to cheat to avoid losses than to obtain
gains.67  Students also work harder to avoid a penalty for missing a deadline
than to obtain a benefit by being timely.68
Reference points affect commonsense understanding of wages relative to
inflation.69  People seem to process improvements in wages in absolute
terms, not relative to inflation.  Consider the following exchange from the
classic TV sitcom, All in the Family, in which the main character (Archie
Bunker) and his friend (Jerome “Stretch” Cunningham) discuss a labor dis-
pute at his workplace with his son-in-law (Michael, a.k.a. “Meathead”):
Archie: We had a perfectly good wage offer last week, but them young hot-
heads down there, they want to hold out for that escalator cost of living
clause.
Michael: Arch, the cost of living escalator clause is the most important thing.
Archie: Why?
Michael: What good is getting a raise if prices keep going up?
Stretch: Oh yeah, and what if prices go down, that means the escalator goes
down with ‘em and that means we have to take a cut.  Uh uh, not on your
sweet patootie!70
In the story, pressure from members like Archie and Stretch leads the union
to settle for a 15% pay increase in the face of a projected inflation rate of
65 Fryer et al., supra note 62, at 3 (“Students whose teachers were in the ‘Loss’ treat-
ment show large and statistically significant gains . . . in math test scores.”).
66 Colin Camerer et al., Labor Supply of New York City Cabdrivers: One Day at a Time, 112
Q.J. ECON. 407 (1997) (demonstrating reference-dependent motivations in taxi drivers);
Tom Chang & Tal Gross, How Many Pears Would a Pear Packer Pack if a Pear Packer Could Pack
Pears at Quasi-Exogenously Varying Piece Rates?, 99 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 1 (2014) (same in
pear packers); see also Alex Imas et al., Do People Anticipate Loss Aversion?, 63 MGMT. SCI.
1271 (2017) (finding that people work harder under loss contracts than under gain
contracts).
67 See Gilles Grolleau et al., Cheating and Loss Aversion: Do People Lie More to Avoid a
Loss?, 62 MNGT. SCI. 3428, 3429 (2016) (“The level of cheating is almost doubled under
advance payments compared to ex post payments.”).
68 Simon Ga¨chter et al., Are Experimental Economists Prone to Framing Effects? A Natural
Field Experiment, 70 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 443, 445 (2009) (finding that 93% of econom-
ics graduate students registered within the deadline to avoid a penalty for missing the
deadline, while only 67% did so to obtain a discount; but economics professors were not
influenced by frame).
69 Tversky & Kahneman, Rational Choice, supra note 2, at S261.
70 All in the Family: The Bunkers and Inflation: Part 4 (CBS television broadcast Oct. 5,
1974).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-2\NDL202.txt unknown Seq: 12 27-DEC-18 9:19
532 notre dame law review [vol. 94:2
20%.71  Despite the practical effect of a 5% pay cut, Archie treats his current
wage as a reference point and celebrates a 15% increase as a fabulous victory.
The prospect of a reduction in the face of deflation would have inflicted an
unthinkable loss, so the escalator clause seemed like a bad bargain.  As the
intuition of the characters suggests, wages are sticky; they commonly fail to
rise sufficiently with inflation and hardly ever fall with deflation.72  In a sys-
tematic account of this response to inflation, Kahneman and his collabora-
tors showed that people think that a 5% wage increase in a time of 12%
inflation is fair, but a 7% wage decrease in a time of 0% inflation is grossly
unfair.73  They termed this phenomenon the “money illusion.”74
Marketers are also well aware of their ability to manipulate the frames in
which people process prices.75  Although “50% off” sales are common, mar-
keting campaigns never emphasize a recent rise in prices (e.g., “50% more
than it used to be”), or the potential for a steeper increase (“50% more, but
it could have been twice that”).76  Similarly, consumers find a discount for
cash payments to be acceptable, but surcharge for credit card payments unac-
ceptable.77  Taxation schemes likewise tend to offer deductions and exemp-
tions for eligible taxpayers, rather than surcharges or additions for taxpayers
who are ineligible.78  As noted in the introduction, some states actually pro-
hibit the use of surcharges for credit cards, even though they allow discounts
for cash.79  The U.S. Supreme Court recently considered whether such a pro-
hibition violates the First Amendment by regulating how vendors can discuss
their efforts to pass the exchange fee that they must pay to credit card com-
71 Id.
72 See Tversky & Kahneman, Rational Choice, supra note 2, at S261 (“The notion of a
money illusion is sometimes applied to workers’ willingness to accept, in periods of high
inflation, increases in nominal wages that do not protect their real income—although they
would strenuously resist equivalent wage cuts in the absence of inflation.”).
73 Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the
Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728, 731 (1986).
74 Tversky & Kahneman, Rational Choice, supra note 2, at S261.
75 See Novemsky & Kahneman, supra note 6, at 125 (“[L]oss aversion may be an impor-
tant mechanism for the success of several practices that are already widespread in
marketing . . . .”).
76 See generally Christopher P. Puto, The Framing of Buying Decisions, 14 J. CONSUMER
RES. 301 (1987).
77 See Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. &
ORG. 39, 45 (1980) (describing the different reactions to discounts and surcharges).
78 See Thomas C. Schelling, Economic Reasoning and the Ethics of Policy, 63 PUB. INT. 37,
54 (1981) (noting that Congress does not differentiate between taxpaying families with
children and those without by adding a “childless premium,” but instead uses deductions
for families with children); see also Karyl A. Kinsey et al., Framing Justice: Taxpayer Evalua-
tions of Personal Tax Burdens, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 845 (1991) (presenting empirical evi-
dence supporting Schelling’s intuition).
79 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 518 (McKinney 2018).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-2\NDL202.txt unknown Seq: 13 27-DEC-18 9:19
2018] gains,  losses ,  and  judges:  framing  and  the  judiciary 533
panies on to consumers.80  Laws like New York’s statute regulating marketing
campaigns thus reflect the reality of reference dependence in consumer
behavior.
Professors Tess Wilkinson-Ryan and David Hoffman have shown how
deeply the frame of reference affects assessment behavior in a contract con-
text.81  In one of their studies, subjects expressed a much greater desire to
punish a painter who had broken a contract in favor of a more lucrative job
(thereby obtaining greater gains) than a painter who broke his promise to
avoid unexpected costs (thereby avoiding unexpected losses).82  The painter
had broken his promise in favor of a identical superior economic outcome of
equal magnitude in both cases.  People were nevertheless unsympathetic to
his effort to obtain extra profits by undertaking a more lucrative job that had
suddenly become available, but were sympathetic to his effort to avoid the
loss associated with unexpected increased costs.83  The pattern is identical to
that observed with discounts and surcharges.
B. The Status Quo Bias
Because a frame of reference is often determined by a decisionmaker’s
current state, people commonly express a status quo bias when choosing
among options.84  Any amenity (a job, an investment portfolio, a regulatory
regime) consists of a collection of attributes.  Trading one amenity for
another with a different collection of attributes usually entails a decrement of
one or more of the attributes, which a decisionmaker would perceive as a
loss.85  That loss would then produce a preference for keeping the collection
of attributes associated with the amenity one already possesses.  Loss aversion
thus “favors stability over change.”86
As one example, Tversky and Kahneman asked research participants to
choose between two jobs.  They found that people who currently have good
social interactions at work prefer a job that has a long commute and good
social interactions to one that has a short commute and poor social interac-
tions, while people who currently have a short commute prefer the oppo-
site.87  Their subjects were unwilling to sacrifice the feature of the job that
they already possessed.
80 Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144 (2017).  The Court
remanded the case for further determination as to the proper construction of the statute.
Id. at 1152.
81 Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & David A. Hoffman, Breach Is for Suckers, 63 VAND. L. REV.
1003, 1028–30 (2010) (describing the study).
82 Id. at 1029 (“Subjects reported that they would be significantly angrier and more
embarrassed in the Gain case than the Loss case.”).
83 Id.
84 Tversky & Kahneman, Loss Aversion, supra note 3, at 1044 (“Loss aversion implies
the status quo bias.”).
85 See id.
86 Kahneman & Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, supra note 2, at 348.
87 See Tversky & Kahneman, Loss Aversion, supra note 3, at 1045.
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Research documents a widespread preference for the status quo.  For
example, Professors William Samuelson and Richard Zeckhauser asked
research subjects to imagine that they had inherited an investment portfolio
and had to choose among a set of four investment strategies.88  The research-
ers found that subjects preferred to retain the initial arbitrarily assigned
investment strategy. That is, subjects who inherited bonds tended to keep
bonds and subjects who inherited stocks tended to keep stocks.  Similarly, a
group of business school students asked to imagine they were airline execu-
tives tasked with choosing among various lease options for airplanes tended
to retain the status quo.89  Extending their work to real decisions, Samuelson
and Zeckhauser examined the investment strategies adopted by faculty at
their universities and found a high degree of attachment to the status quo in
health insurance plans and retirement investment funds—even when new
and better options became available, and even when decisionmakers knew
that their original choice was uninformed.90  Several factors create the status
quo bias, such as the cost of switch (cognitive or financial), procrastination,
psychological commitment to a choice, and rational brand loyalty.  But loss
aversion plays a key role in the status quo bias as well.91
Because preferences about public policy also involve trade-offs and refer-
ence points, policy choices are also affected by the status quo.92  As Professor
Russell Korobkin put it, “[i]f the air is clean and gas expensive, you are more
likely to prefer clean air and expensive gas to cheap gas and dirty air than
you would if the air were dirty and gas cheap.”93  Systematic experiments
bear out Korobkin’s assessment.  One study of utility customers, for example,
found that customers with historically good service expressed an unwilling-
ness to tolerate reductions in service quality (even at reduced cost) while
those customers with historically poor services were eager to pay more for
better service.94  Similarly, a survey of Toronto residents showed that
although a majority were unwilling to accept an increase in accident rates
from 0.5% to 1.0% per year in exchange for a $700 increase in income, a
majority were also unwilling to accept a $700 decrease in income in exchange
for a reduction in accident risk from 1.0% to 0.5% per year.95  Further, Sam-
uelson and Zeckhauser found that subjects asked to reallocate water rights in
88 William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J.
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 12–18 (1988) (describing this research).
89 Id. at 22–26.
90 Id. at 26–33.
91 Id. at 35–37.
92 See Cass R. Sunstein, Public Choice, Endogenous Preferences, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON.
289, 289–90 (1992) (attributing regulatory stasis to loss aversion); see also Cass R. Sunstein,
Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129 (1986) (reviewing the impli-
cations of the endowment effect for public policy decisions).
93 Korobkin, supra note 38, at 1229.
94 Raymond S. Hartman et al., Consumer Rationality and the Status Quo, 106 Q.J. ECON.
141, 143–44 (1991).
95 Jack L. Knetsch, The Endowment Effect and Evidence of Nonreversible Indifference Curves,
79 AM. ECON. REV. 1277, 1281 (1998) (reporting results).
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a time of drought tended to maintain water supplies that were as close to the
original allocation as possible, even when alternatives would have spread the
pain of the drought more evenly.96  These studies suggest that “once estab-
lished, altering the legislative or regulatory status quo will be difficult.”97
Legal entitlements can change the status quo and dramatically alter
choices.  For example, in the late 1980s, New Jersey and Pennsylvania
adopted legislation that allowed motorists to choose between two automobile
insurance programs: an inexpensive program which restricted their right to
sue other motorists and a more expensive one in which the right to sue was
unrestricted.98  Each state set a different status quo, however.  Pennsylvania
set the default as insurance that included the unrestricted right to sue with
an option to choose cheaper insurance with less expansive rights, while New
Jersey set the opposite default.  “[O]nly about 20% of New Jersey drivers
chose to acquire the full right to sue, while approximately 75% of Penn-
sylvanians retained the full right to sue.”99  The status quo that the respective
legislatures arbitrarily created thus largely determined the choices of the
motorists in each state.
C. The Endowment Effect
Although several factors likely contributed to the power of the status quo
in the insurance study, one potential implication of the results is that the
default rule led Pennsylvania motorists to value their right to sue more than
the New Jersey motorists.  If so, this would be an example of what researchers
label the endowment effect.100  The endowment effect consists of attaching
greater value to an owned commodity than an unowned commodity.101  It is
“[a]n immediate consequence of loss aversion” in that “the loss of utility asso-
ciated with giving up a valued good is greater than the utility gain associated
with receiving it.”102  As Nobel Prize–winning economist Richard Thaler
described it, “if out-of-pocket costs are viewed as losses and opportunity costs
are viewed as foregone gains, the former will be more heavily weighted.”103
96 Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 88, at 19–21.
97 Korobkin, supra note 38, at 1266.
98 Eric J. Johnson et al., Framing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance Decisions, 7 J. RISK
& UNCERTAINTY 35, 48 (1993).
99 Id.
100 Because reference-dependent choice, the status quo bias, and the endowment effect
all arise directly from loss aversion (risk-seeking choices are a little different), the line
between them is somewhat arbitrary.  As Korobkin notes, the terms are used interchangea-
bly at times.  Korobkin, supra note 38, at 1228 (noting that status quo bias is “often used
interchangeably with [the endowment effect]”).
101 See Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status
Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 194 (1991) (defining the endowment effect as the observa-
tion that “people often demand much more to give up an object than they would be willing
to pay to acquire it”); Thaler, supra note 77, at 44 (defining the endowment effect as the
“underweighting of opportunity costs”).
102 Tversky & Kahneman, Loss Aversion, supra note 3, at 1041.
103 Thaler, supra note 77, at 44.
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He went on to note that this tendency produces “a certain degree of inertia”
in consumer choice because “goods that are included in the individual’s
endowment will be more highly valued than those not held in the
endowment.”104
In the classic demonstration of the endowment effect, researchers found
that people demand much more to sell a good than they are willing to pay to
buy the same good.105  For example, the median maximum price that stu-
dents were willing to pay for a coffee mug with a university logo was $2.87,
but when given the mug, the median minimum price at which students were
willing to sell it was $7.12.106  Other groups in the same study also exhibited a
status quo bias, in that when they were given either a mug or a fancy pen
(choosing randomly for each student) as a reward for participating in a sepa-
rate experiment, and then offered a chance to trade for the other commod-
ity, most kept their original prize.107  People also express endowment effects
for chocolate bars, pen sets, binoculars, and lottery tickets.108
The endowment effect influences a wide variety of valuation decisions.
People express a much greater interest in avoiding the loss of a public good
than in obtaining the same good.109  In particular, people demand far more
in compensation to suffer the loss of an environmental amenity (such as
clean air or preservation of an endangered species) than they are willing to
pay to produce that amenity.110  People display a similar endowment effect
for risk to life and limb.  In one study, people were asked to imagine that they
had been exposed to a disease that gave them a 0.001% chance of death and
asked how much they would be willing to pay for a cure that would remove
that risk.111  The amounts were vastly smaller than those stated by a different
group who were asked what amount they would have to be compensated for
their permission to be exposed to the same risk as part of a research study.112
104 Id.
105 See Kahneman et al., supra note 101, at 195–96.
106 Id. at 196.
107 Id.
108 See Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase
Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990) (chocolate, pens, and binoculars); Jack L. Knetsch
& J.A. Sinden, Willingness to Pay and Compensation Demanded: Experimental Evidence of an
Unexpected Disparity in Measures of Value, 99 Q.J. ECON. 507 (1984) (lottery tickets); see also
Matthew Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 11, 14–15 (1998) (review-
ing research on the endowment effect).
109 See Kahneman et al., supra note 108, at 1327 tbl.1 (reviewing studies).
110 See Jack L. Knetsch, Values of Gains and Losses: Reference States and Choice of Measure, 46
ENVTL. RESOURCE ECON. 179, 179 (2010) (“Pervasive wide disparities between valuations of
gains and losses have been demonstrated in survey studies, in controlled laboratory and
field experiments, and in everyday decisions of people in non-experimental settings . . .
and with particular attention to environmental changes . . . .”); see also John K. Horowitz &
Kenneth E. McConnell, A Review of WTA/WTP Studies, 44 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 426
(2002) (reviewing research on the disparity between willingness to pay and willingness to
accept).
111 See Thaler, supra note 77, at 43–44.
112 Id.
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Consumers asked about household chemicals expressed similarly anomalous
preference structures—their willingness to pay for safer products was vastly
smaller than their willingness to accept riskier pesticides at lower prices;113
indeed, some of the consumers in the study refused to accept an increase in
risk no matter what the cost savings, even though their willingness to pay to
reduce a risk by a comparable amount was modest.114
People also endow legal interests such as contract rights and remedies
covered by tort.  In a series of experiments, Professor Russell Korobkin
showed that people who are given a legal right are far less willing to sell it
than to buy the same right when they do not already have it.115  In his stud-
ies, half of his subjects evaluated how much they would pay to obtain the
right to recover consequential damages for lost packages (against a default of
no right to recover consequential damages), while the other half evaluated
how much they would accept to waive their right to obtain consequential
damages (against a default of a right to recover consequential damages).116
The subjects demanded much more to forego their rights than to obtain the
same rights.117  In the tort context, Professors Edward McCaffery, Daniel
Kahneman, and Matthew Spitzer found that mock jurors impose higher dam-
age awards when they are asked how much they would have to be compen-
sated for the loss of a limb than when they are asked to assign compensation
to make whole a victim who has lost a limb.118
Like the status quo bias, the endowment effect can create resistance to
legislative or regulatory changes.  As Korobkin described this inertia, “parties
who benefit from the status quo will fight harder to avoid a change in the
status quo than they would have fought to establish their preferred position if
the status quo had been the opposite.”119  Consequently, “changing a law
that reflects one balance of costs and benefits may be difficult even if a differ-
ent balance would be preferred were the issue to be addressed today for the
first time.”120  The Republican Party discovered precisely this inertia with
respect to healthcare reform.  People grow attached to the healthcare pro-
113 W. Kip Viscusi et al., An Investigation of the Rationality of Consumer Valuations of Multi-
ple Health Risks, 18 RAND J. ECON. 465, 477 (1987) (“[W]hen individuals assess the implica-
tions of increases in risk from their current level, they act as if they possess a much higher
rate of tradeoff of risk for money than for decisions involving risk decreases.”); see also
Ilana Ritov et al., Framing Effects in the Evaluation of Multiple Risk Reduction, 6 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 145 (1993) (reporting similar results with a variety of environmental risks).
114 See Viscusi et al., supra note 113, at 477 (reporting that for products involving even
modest risk increases “up to three-fourths of all consumers said that they would refuse to
buy the product at any discount below its purchase price”).
115 Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV.
608 (1998).
116 Id. at 633–47 (describing the experimental design).
117 Id. at 639.
118 Edward J. McCaffery et al., Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspectives on Pain and Suffering
Awards, 81 VA. L. REV. 1341 (1995).
119 Korobkin, supra note 38, at 1266.
120 Id.
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grams they currently possess.121  Surveys indicate that the Affordable Care
Act gained in popularity once its repeal became a realistic option.122  With
many healthcare benefits firmly established under the Affordable Care Act,
the value of the benefits seemed suddenly greater to many.123  If the Republi-
can Party had been constructing an approach to healthcare from the ground
up, they might well have preferred never to have created any such program,
but with a program in place, many Republicans lost their enthusiasm for dis-
mantling it.
D. Risk-Seeking Choices Among Losses
The effort to avoid losses also produces a surprising embrace of risky
decisions.  As Tversky and Kahneman first noticed when studying gambles
with negative values, people tend to make risk-averse decisions when choos-
ing between options that appear to represent gains, but tend to make risk-
seeking decisions when choosing between options that appear to represent
losses.124  In particular, this tendency seems to be driven by a desire to avoid
sure losses.125
The different approaches people take for gains as opposed to losses pro-
duces striking arbitrariness in preferences.  For example, people asked to
imagine that they have just been given $1,000 and then offered the choice
between gambles A and B prefer B, the certainty of $500.126
A: 50% chance of winning $1,000 more (50% chance of winning nothing)
B: $500 for sure
But people asked to imagine that they have just been given $2,000 and then
offered the choice between gambles C and D prefer D, the riskier choice.127
C: 50% chance of losing $1,000 (50% chance of losing nothing)
D: $500 loss for sure
121 See Miriam Krieger & Stefan Felder, Can Decision Biases Improve Insurance Outcomes?
An Experiment on Status Quo Bias in Health Insurance Choice, 10 INT’L J. ENVTL. RES. & PUB.
HEALTH 2560 (2013).
122 Madeline Conway, Poll: Obamacare at Its Most Popular on Eve of Repeal, POLITICO (Jan.
17, 2017), http://www.politico.com/story/2017/01/poll-how-popularity-is-obamacare-
233700.
123 See, e.g., Charles Krauthammer, Commentary: Hard to Take Entitlements Away: GOP Les-
son from Obamacare, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Mar. 17, 2017) https://www.orlandosentinel.com/
opinion/os-ed-tough-to-take-away-entitlements-krauthammer-20170317-story.html (“The
Lord giveth and the Lord taketh away, but for governments it’s not that easy.  Once some-
thing is given—say, health insurance coverage to 20 million Americans—you take it away at
your peril.”).
124 See supra notes 42–48 and accompanying text.
125 Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory, supra note 1, at 269 (“[C]ertainty increases
the aversiveness of losses.”).
126 Id. at 273.
127 See id.
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The initial endowment alters the frame of reference, such that the first set of
gambles involves potential gains, while the second set of gambles involves
potential losses.  The two gambles, however, produce economically identical
outcomes.
Even without the subterfuge of initial endowments, people adopt differ-
ent approaches to issues involving losses than issues involving gains.  Con-
sider the well-known public-health decision Kahneman and Tversky
constructed, involving an Asian disease.  The problem asks research partici-
pants to:
Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian
disease, which is expected to kill 600 people.  Two alternative programs to
combat the disease have been proposed.  Assume that the exact scientific
estimates of the consequences of the programs are as follows:
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved.  (72%)
If Program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that 600 people
will be saved, and a two-thirds probability that no people will be saved.
(28%)128
In a second version of the problem, Kahneman and Tversky provided the
same introductory paragraph, but altered the description of the two options
as follows:
If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die. (22%)
If Program D is adopted, there is a one-third probability that nobody
will die, and a two-thirds probability that 600 people will die.  (78%)129
When presented with the first version of the problem, 72% of the sub-
jects made the risk-averse choice of saving 200 people for sure, whereas only
22% of the subjects presented with the second version made the same
choice—the majority preferred the risk-seeking option instead.130  Frame
thus influences risk preferences.
Although the problem has received heavy criticism,131 it stands as a com-
pelling demonstration that people react differently to arbitrary distinctions
between gains and losses.  The same disparity seems to exist in more realistic
choices in the medical context.  In one such study, both doctors and patients
expressed greater willingness to recommend or undergo a surgical proce-
dure that had a 10% mortality risk but would otherwise extend the expected
life of a terminally ill patient by two years when that risk was expressed as a
90% survival rate as opposed to a 10% fatality rate.132  Anecdotally, in the
1960s, researchers at the National Cancer Institute received praise in many
128 Kahneman & Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, supra note 2, at 343. R
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 See David R. Mandel, Gain-Loss Framing and Choice: Separating Outcome Formulations
from Descriptor Formulations, 85 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 56, 66
(2001) (offering critiques of the Asian disease problem).
132 See McNeil et al., supra note 7, at 1261 (reporting results); see also Dawn K. Wilson et
al., Framing of Decisions and Selections of Alternatives in Health Care, 2 SOC. BEHAV. 51 (1987)
(reporting similar results).
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quarters for their use of a drug cocktail that cured leukemia patients but was
so toxic that two out of three patients did not survive the treatment; while in
contrast many other doctors decried the treatment as barbaric because it
seemed to sacrifice two children to save one.133  Neither perspective (saving
one in three children as opposed to killing two out of three) is wholly right
or wrong, but characterizing treatment either way has profound effects on
how people value it.
The divergence in risk preferences has also been shown to influence
judgments in legal contexts.134  Two notable instances include litigants’ reac-
tions to settlement offers and taxpayers’ willingness to risk penalties for
underreporting income.  As to the former, research has demonstrated that
litigation provides a natural frame, in which plaintiffs choose among gains
while defendants choose among losses.135  Plaintiffs are thus much more
inclined to accept settlement offers than are defendants.136  Defendants try
to avoid the certain loss of a settlement by rejecting even economically
favorable settlements, gambling that further litigation will bring a better out-
come, even though it also carries great risk.137  Criminal defendants also face
a certain loss by accepting a plea bargain, and might thus be unwisely willing
to gamble on trials.138  For taxpayers, filing a tax return also creates a natural
frame.139  At the time they file their taxes, some taxpayers find that they have
overpaid and will receive a refund while others find that they have underpaid
and will have to pay more.  Taxpayers facing payment at filing time are more
inclined to risk further penalties by cheating on their taxes than are those
133 See SIDDHARTHA MUKHERJEE, THE EMPEROR OF ALL MALADIES: A BIOGRAPHY OF CAN-
CER 150 (2010).
134 See Guthrie, supra note 37, for a comprehensive summary of the literature on the
implications of divergent risk preference between gains and losses for law.
135 See Rachlinski, supra note 31, at 129 (“Litigation appears to supply a natural
frame.”); see also KISER, supra note 31, at 29–86 (replicating these results with a much larger
data sample).
136 Rachlinski, supra note 31, at 159 (“[P]laintiffs’ behavior was, on balance, risk
averse.”).
137 Id. (“[D]efendants’ decisions to litigate constituted risk-seeking choices.”).  This dis-
parity between plaintiffs and defendants is reversed for lawsuits in which the plaintiff is
unlikely to succeed. See Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67
U. CHI. L. REV. 163, 196 (2000) (explaining that in low-probability lawsuits, “plaintiffs make
risk-seeking decisions because the decision frame in frivolous litigation induces them to
overweight their low-probability chances of prevailing at trial”).
138 See Guthrie, supra note 37.  The vast majority of criminal defendants plead guilty,
however, suggesting that other factors overwhelm the framing effect in this context.
139 See Robben et al., supra note 34, at 344–45 (“The taxpayer expecting a refund may
see it as a gain. . . . By contrast, since the taxpayer expecting to owe money is more likely to
see the additional payment as a loss, the probability is greater that he or she will risk filing
a fraudulent return in order to reduce the anticipated loss.”).
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who are already receiving a refund.140  Taxpayers largely take the risk of
cheating to avoid losses, rather than to increase their refunds.
E. Framing Effects in Judges
Framing effects thus have significant implications for the development
of law.  One of the most important implications of framing effects for law is
that people cannot easily bargain around legal rules, which undermines a
fundamental tenet of the Coase Theorem.141  Coase argued that in the
absence of transaction costs, judges could not undermine economic effi-
ciency, because parties simply bargain around their decisions.142  That is, if a
court allocated an entitlement to one party who valued it less than another,
the higher-value party would simply trade it.  Loss aversion, the status quo
bias, and the endowment effect, however, all suggest that rights will tend to
remain with the winning party in a lawsuit.  Studies of nuisance suits support
this conclusion empirically.143  The implications of loss aversion for law are
thus thought to be as expansive as the Coase Theorem itself, making loss
aversion a foundational influence on the evolution of legal doctrine.144
As discussed above, loss aversion can have a dramatic effect on the legis-
lative process.  Scholars have suggested that loss aversion influences the
development of the common law as well.145  Judges might face a similar kind
140 See id. at 358 tbl.2 (reporting results); see also ERICH KIRCHLER, THE ECONOMIC PSY-
CHOLOGY OF TAX BEHAVIOUR 129–51 (2007) (reviewing evidence of framing effects in tax
compliance).
141 See ZAMIR, supra note 33, at 21–22 (“The endowment effect similarly contradicts the
Coase Theorem . . . .”); Kahneman et al., supra note 108, at 1326 (“[T]here is wide accept-
ance of the Coase theorem assertion that, subject to income effects, the allocation of
resources will be independent of the assignment of property rights when costless trades are
possible.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 106, 112 (2002)
(“The Coase Theorem fails to account for the fact that the initial allocation seems to create
an endowment effect.  When the endowment effect is at work, those who initially receive a
legal right value it more than they would if the initial allocation had given the right to
someone else.” (footnote omitted)); Tversky & Kahneman, Loss Aversion, supra note 3, at
1039 (“[T]he Coase theorem asserts that, except for transaction costs, initial entitlements
do not affect final allocations.”).
142 See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
143 See Ward Farnsworth, Do Parties to Nuisance Cases Bargain After Judgment? A Glimpse
Inside the Cathedral, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 373 (1999); Yun-chien Chang & Chang-Ching Lin,
Do Parties Negotiate After Trespass Litigation? An Empirical Study of Coasean Bargaining
(2017) (unpublished manuscript).
144 See Korobkin, supra note 38, at 1231–32 (explaining that loss aversion implies that
“not only is the Coase Theorem incorrect, or at least incomplete, the broad range of legal
prescriptions based on Coase’s insights requires reevaluation”); see also Samuel Issacharoff,
Can There Be a Behavioral Law and Economics?, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1729, 1735 (1998) (“The
endowment effect is the most significant empirical observation from behavioral
economics.”).
145 See ZAMIR, supra note 33, at 171–74 (discussing how loss aversion can affect the
development of law).
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of path dependence in the cases they decide.146  Deciding to eliminate a
right of recovery, a property right, or a constitutional right would inflict a loss
on litigants and potential litigants.  Likewise recognizing a novel right of
recovery likely inflicts a loss on another set of parties.  Judges do not hold the
entitlements that they adjudicate, of course, but they could experience loss
aversion concerning legal entitlements.  Judges have preferences about pol-
icy, just as everyone else does.147  They might feel the loss of a policy position
that they favor.  The judges’ positions are perhaps akin to those of the survey
respondents, who appear to value the potential loss of public goods like envi-
ronmental amenities more than the potential gain of the same goods.  Judges
might also empathize more with litigants who face the loss of a legal entitle-
ment than with litigants arguing for the creation of a novel one.148  Further-
more, litigants facing losses might litigate more frequently or more
vigorously than those facing potential gains, thereby pushing the law in a
particular direction.149
Law does seem sticky in the way that loss aversion implies.  Few areas of
law have witnessed the reduction of individual rights through the judicial
process.  Once established, constitutional rights, whether to an abortion or
an individual right to gun ownership, seem to stick.  Modification or even
erosion of rights occurs, but the wholesale elimination of an established enti-
tlement is almost unheard of.  Exceptions exist, of course.  For example,
many states began adopting a “good faith” limitation on “at-will employment”
only to eliminate this restriction in decades that followed.150  With few excep-
tions, however, the judicial establishment of legal rights seems to stick.
Despite the extensive documentation of loss aversion in many contexts
and despite hundreds of articles assuming that it influences the development
of law, its influence on judges is uncertain.  Even outside of the judicial con-
text, loss aversion has attracted critics who claim it is an overstated experi-
mental artifact that disappears when proper controls are in place.151  Other
146 See generally Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of
Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601 (2001) (arguing that law follows
a path-dependent course, adhering to existing doctrine); Andrew J. Wistrich, The Evolving
Temporality of Lawmaking, 44 CONN. L. REV. 737 (2012) (discussing how existing law con-
strains doctrinal development).
147 See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES (2013) (asserting that
judges implement policy preferences in their decisions).
148 Cohen & Knetsch, supra note 21, at 749 (arguing that “judges . . . respond to an
intuitive, non-empirical interpretation of community mores and individual preferences”
that would include loss aversion).
149 See ZAMIR, supra note 33, at 172 (“If, however, people perceive losses as much more
painful than unobtained gains, potential plaintiffs can be expected to sue for unobtained
gains much less than for losses.”).
150 Rachel Arnow-Richman, Modifying At-Will Employment Contracts, 57 B.C. L. REV. 427,
469–75 (2016).
151 See Charles R. Plott & Kathryn Zeiler, The Willingness to Pay—Willingness to Accept
Gap, the “Endowment Effect,” Subject Misconceptions, and Experimental Procedures for Eliciting Val-
uations, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 530, 532 (2005) (“When an incentive-compatible mechanism is
used to elicit valuations, and subjects are provided with (a) a detailed explanation of the
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research suggests that experts suffer less from loss aversion.152  Careful statis-
tical reviews of the magnitude of loss aversion across many studies also sug-
gest that the average effect of decision framing is small to moderate
(although it can be large in some settings).153  Variations on endowment
effect research also involve some instances in which the right to a commodity
(a token to be traded for a mug) did not actually produce an endowment
effect—physical possession of the good seemed essential.154  Furthermore,
institutional settings in which actors behave as agents for others also do not
seem to exhibit an endowment effect, in at least some experiments.155  In
sum, the setting in which judges function is sufficiently different from the
research on the endowment effect that its influence on how law develops are
uncertain.
Some research hints at the influence of loss aversion on judges, but the
link is indirect.  Many of the odd asymmetries between gains and losses in
various legal rules we listed at the outset of this Article are judicial cre-
ations,156 which suggests that loss aversion affects judges.  Others assert that
mechanism and how to arrive at valuations; (b) paid practice using the mechanism; and
(c) anonymity, we observe no [endowment effect].”).  But see  Korobkin, supra note 38, at
1243 (“Although experimental conditions probably have some explanatory power in some
cases, the weight of the evidence suggests that it is extremely unlikely that the effect is
merely an artifact of the experimental methods that demonstrate it.”).  For further replies
and criticisms, see Gregory Klass & Kathryn Zeiler, Against Endowment Theory: Experimental
Economics and Legal Scholarship, 61 UCLA L. REV. 2 (2013); Charles R. Plott & Kathryn
Zeiler, The Willingness to Pay—Willingness to Accept Gap, the “Endowment Effect,” Subject Miscon-
ceptions, and Experimental Procedures for Eliciting Valuations: Reply, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 1012
(2011).
152 See John A. List, Does Market Experience Eliminate Market Anomalies?, 118 Q.J. ECON. 41,
67 (2003).
153 See Anton Ku¨hberger et al., The Effects of Framing, Reflection, Probability, and Payoff on
Risk Preference in Choice Tasks, 78 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 204,
210 tbl.2, 219 (1999). But see Jonathan de Quidt et al., Bonus Versus Penalty: How Robust Are
the Effects of Contract Framing?, 3 J. ECON. SCI. ASS’N 174, 175, 180 (2017) (describing the
conflicting results of experiments concerning whether “incentives are more effective when
they are famed as penalties for poor performance rather than bonuses for good perform-
ance”); David Gal & Derek D. Rucker, The Loss of Loss Aversion: Will It Loom Larger Than Its
Gains?, 28 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 497 (2018) (arguing that researchers have overstated the
magnitude of loss aversion).
154 See Kahneman et al., supra note 108, at 1329–31 (noting that tokens to be
exchanged for commodities did not produce an endowment effect); Vernon L. Smith,
Experimental Economics: Induced Value Theory, 66 AM. ECON. ASS’N 274, 277–78 (1976) (not-
ing the same result).
155 See Jennifer Arlen et al., Endowment Effects Within Corporate Agency Relationships, 31 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 5 (2002) (“Our central finding is that situating subjects in an agency con-
text significantly dampens the magnitude (and perhaps even the existence) of the endow-
ment effect.”); see also Jennifer Arlen & Stephan Tontrup, Does the Endowment Effect Justify
Legal Intervention? The Debiasing Effect of Institutions, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. 143 (2015) (asserting
that institutional contexts like agency can eliminate the endowment effect).
156 See supra notes 21–36 and accompanying text; see also ZAMIR, supra note 33, at
226–27 (reviewing evidence that loss aversion affects judges).
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the allocations of burdens of proof and stare decisis are attributable to loss
aversion among judges.157  Although loss aversion provides a parsimonious
account of these areas of law, most of these asymmetries can be explained in
other ways.  Some researchers have attributed anomalous findings in their
empirical studies of judicial decisionmaking to loss aversion as well.158
In a previous study of sitting judges, we found some evidence that loss
aversion influences how judges think about litigation.159  In that study, we
asked judges to evaluate a hypothetical copyright case in the context of a
settlement conference on the eve of trial.  We indicated that the amount in
controversy was $200,000, that the plaintiff had a 50% chance of winning at
trial, and that the parties would also each likely pay $50,000 in attorneys’ fees
if they failed to settle the case and proceeded to trial.160  We told judges that
one of the parties had asked them for advice regarding a settlement offer.
For half of the judges, the party was the plaintiff, who was considering a
$60,000 settlement offer proposed by the defendant.161  For the other half,
the party was the defendant, who was considering a $140,000 offer proposed
by the plaintiff.162  We asked the judges in each version whether they
thought that the party should be willing to accept the settlement offer.  Con-
sistent with the pattern of risk preferences that framing creates, judges were
more inclined to support settlement for the plaintiff (who faced gains) than
for the defendant (who faced losses).163  Although the effect of the frame
was smaller for judges than for others who have reviewed similar problems,
judges were still less inclined to support the certain loss for defendants than
they were to support the certain gain for plaintiffs.164
Similarly, in a study of administrative law judges, we replicated a classic
demonstration showing that framing influences fairness judgments.165  We
asked a group of thirty-eight New York City administrative law judges attend-
157 Robert A. Prentice & Jonathan J. Koehler, A Normality Bias in Legal Decision Making,
88 CORNELL L. REV. 583, 638–39 (2003) (discussing stare decisis); Eyal Zamir & Ilana Ritov,
Loss Aversion, Omission Bias, and the Burden of Proof in Civil Litigation, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 165
(2012) (discussing burden of proof).
158 See generally Mark Schweizer, Loss Aversion, Omission Bias and the Civil Standard of
Proof, in EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES ON BEHAVIOURAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 125 (Klaus Mathis
ed., 2015); Keith Sharfman, Judicial Valuation Behavior: Some Evidence from Bankruptcy, 32
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 387 (2005).
159 See Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 796–99
(2001).
160 Id. at 796.
161 Id. at 796–97.  The offer was $10,000 better than the expected outcome at trial,
which was a 50% chance of winning a $200,000 award minus the $50,000 in attorneys’ fees.
162 Id. at 797.  The offer was $10,000 better than the expected outcome at trial, which
was a fifty percent chance of losing a $200,000 award plus the $50,000 in attorneys’ fees.
Id. at 795.
163 Id. at 797.
164 Id. at 817 tbl.4.
165 Chris Guthrie et al., The “Hidden Judiciary”: An Empirical Examination of Executive
Branch Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1477, 1506–09 (2009).  For a discussion of discounts versus
surcharges, see supra notes 75–80 and accompanying text.
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ing an educational conference to assess the fairness of a rent-payment system.
Half of the judges assessed whether a payment system that added a $50
surcharge to the monthly rent for using a credit card to pay was fair, while
the other half assessed whether a payment system that offered a $50 discount
for cash was fair.166  Although 47% of the judges assessing the system that
included a surcharge found it to be unfair, only 5% of the judges assessing
the system that included a discount found it to be unfair.167  The judges in
our study thus treated surcharges as losses and discounts as potential gains,
thereby expressing the same kind of reference dependence that Kahneman
and his collaborators found in lay adults.168
Our previous studies, however, did not involve assessing legal arguments.
Loss aversion can only affect the development of the common law if it influ-
ences how judges evaluate cases.  To test whether judges experience loss aver-
sion when analyzing cases, we conducted a series of eight experiments with
judges as research participants.  We gave judges attending educational con-
ferences hypothetical cases in which they assessed either a gain or a loss.
Across eight different cases, we tested the four main phenomena that arise
from framing effects—reference dependence, the status quo bias, the endow-
ment effect, and risk seeking among losses.  We found that judges treat losses
and gains very differently.
II. METHODOLOGY
The data described in this Article were collected during presentations
made by one or both of us at judicial education programs that included a
total of 1,186 judges.  The presentations and demographic data on the judges
are summarized in Table 1.
166 Guthrie et al., supra note 165, at 1508.
167 Id.
168 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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TABLE 1:  SUMMARY OF JUDGES IN THE STUDIES AND DEMOGRAPHICS
(all are state trial judges except as noted)
Study # & Effect Judges (n) % Female Experience % Dem.
Scenario (Median Years)
1. Salary Reference Cal. (40) 33 13 33
Dispute Dependence
2. Breach of Reference Cal. (40) 33 13 33
Contract Dependence Ohio (89) 19 11 29
Minn. (119) 43 10 87
NY (12) 55 15 36
3. Mutual Status Quo Utah (51) 16 9 42
Mistake Bias
4. Employm’t Status Quo Fl. (146) 18 14 47
Bias
5. Medical Endowment NY (new 43 0 52
Malpractice Effect judges) (71)
Minn. (fed.) n/a n/a n/a
(16)
Am. Judges 38 11 77
Ass’n (112)
6. Water Endowment New Mexico 39 8 73
Rights Effect (144)
Canada 24 7 n/a
(trial) (36)
Alaska (24) 33 n/a n/a
7. Products Risk Seeking 7th Cir. n/a n/a n/a
Liability (fed.) (74)
Fed. 38 8 80
Magistrate
Judges (139)
8. Bankruptcy Risk Seeking Bankruptcy 27 8 77
Judges (113)
To obtain the data, we used the opportunity to present our research at
continuing education programs for judges, a method we have employed for
numerous research projects.169  At the outset of our programs, we ask the
169 See Guthrie et al., supra note 159, at 816–18 (2001) (describing our methodology).
We have previously reported research on judicial decisionmaking utilizing this
methodology in a series of papers. See Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges
Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2007); Guthrie et al., supra note 159; Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski et al., Altering Attention in Adjudication, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1586 (2013); Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski et al., Can Judges Make Reliable Numeric Judgments? Distorted Damages and Skewed
Sentences, 90 IND. L.J. 695 (2015); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Contrition in the Courtroom: Do
Apologies Affect Adjudication?, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1189 (2013); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al.,
Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195 (2009); Jeffrey
J. Rachlinski et al., Probable Cause, Probability, Hindsight, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 72
(2011); Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of
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judges to respond to a written questionnaire containing three to five
hypothetical cases or tests.170  For the most part, judges are not attending our
conference out of particular interest in psychology.  Most of our
presentations are during plenary programs rather than in parallel sessions
and many of them are attended by most of the judges in a jurisdiction.
Hence, the judges are attending an educational program on judging, rather
than attending a session on psychological aspects of decisionmaking.
Furthermore, we use presentation titles that are vague (such as “judicial
decisionmaking”) so as not to reveal what our research involves before the
judges respond to the questionnaire.
We used a between-subjects experimental design in all of our studies
presented here.171  Each of the studies included two versions of a
hypothetical case, thereby creating two experimental conditions.  One
version described the case from the perspective of gains and the other from
the perspective of losses.  We randomly assign each judge to review only one
of the two versions of each case.  Differences between the aggregated
decisions made by the individual judges comprising the two conditions can
thus be attributed to the factor that we varied.
In most cases we also asked the judges to provide demographic
information, such as gender, political affiliation, years of judicial experience,
etc.  Table 1 reports the demographic results.172  We did not, however, ask
participants to identify themselves.  We also gave judges the opportunity to
complete the survey for pedagogic purposes, but to opt out of allowing us to
use their questionnaire in any further research.  Nearly all of the judges who
attended our presentations completed the voluntary survey and authorized
us to use their results in the research described below.173
Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251 (2005); Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Heart
Versus Head: Do Judges Follow the Law or Follow Their Feelings?, 93 TEX. L. REV. 855 (2015)
[hereinafter Wistrich et al., Heart Versus Head].
170 The stimulus materials  can be found in the Appendix.
171 See ROBERT M. LAWLESS ET AL., EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW 104 (2d ed. 2010)
(describing “between-subjects” experimental designs).
172 When “n/a” appears in Table 1, it is because we did not include demographic
questions.  Some judges are more sensitive about such questions and we avoided asking
them in some cases.  Some judges did not provide some or all of the demographic
information.  We requested political orientation with the following question: “Which of the
two major political parties in the United States most closely matches your own political
beliefs?”  Some judges responded to this question by stating that they are independent or
do not feel attachment to either party.  We treat these responses as missing data.
173 Roughly one percent of the judges we have surveyed have indicated that they would
prefer that we do not use their surveys in our analysis, and we always honor such requests.
We report the number of judges who failed to respond to a particular hypothetical in our
description of the results of each experiment.
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III. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
A. Study 1: Salary Dispute (Reference Dependence #1)
During the oral arguments for Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman,174
the Justices seemed to understand that reference dependence is an illusion
of judgment.  As noted above, the case challenged the constitutionality of a
New York statute that prohibits surcharges for the use of credit cards, but
allows discounts for the use of cash.175  Chief Justice Roberts ridiculed the
statute as patronizing for its implicit assumption that consumers do not
understand how surcharges work.176  Justice Breyer also easily understood
the economic equivalence between using a surcharge and a discount, but
expressed concern that “not everybody is an economist.”177  He seemed also
to understand that people react differently to surcharges than to discounts.
But do most judges understand the illusions of judgment that reference
dependence creates?  We suspect not.  The study we conducted with adminis-
trative law judges, described above, revealed large disparities in how they
reacted to discounts and surcharges.178  In that study, however, we did not
ask for a legal judgment, but for an assessment of fairness.  Perhaps requiring
judges to make a judgment with direct legal consequences would allow them
to see and ignore the illusion that reference dependence creates.
1. Methods and Materials
To test whether judges react to reference dependence in a legal setting,
we tested for what psychologists call the “money illusion.”179  The money illu-
sion is a myopic effort to avoid an apparent loss from the status quo, while
ignoring the effects of inflation.  The scene from All in the Family, described
above, characterizes it perfectly.180  Employees worry about reductions in sal-
ary relative to their current salary, not relative to inflation.  We tested
whether judges would fall prey to the same illusion.
In our test for this form of reference dependence, we gave a hypotheti-
cal contract dispute to forty California trial judges attending a state-spon-
sored educational conference.  The judges assessed one of two versions of a
dispute involving an independent contractor.  The facts were as follows:
Imagine you are presiding over a bench trial involving an alleged breach of a
written contract.  The plaintiff is an independent consultant working full
time for a small tech company on a series of projects over the course of
174 137 S. Ct. 1144 (2017).
175 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
176 While questioning the attorney representing the State of New York, Chief Justice
Roberts asserted: “You’re saying that the—the American people are too dumb to under-
stand that if you say $10 plus a 20-cent surcharge, they can’t figure out that that’s $10.20.”
Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. 1144 (No. 15-1391).
177 Id. at 10.
178 See supra notes 165–68 and accompanying text.
179 Tversky & Kahneman, Rational Choice, supra note 2, at S261.
180 See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text.
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several years.  The parties agreed that the firm would pay the plaintiff a fixed
salary that was consistent with the going rate in his profession for the first
year, and then a “fair salary” thereafter.  The company is making a small
profit.  At the time, the industry was experiencing a recession with substan-
tial unemployment but the area had no inflation.  There were many other con-
sultants anxious to work at the firm.  The company decided to decrease the
salary paid to the plaintiff 7% for the second year of work.  The plaintiff
sued, contending that the salary in the second year was not a “fair salary.”
Half of the judges read the version described above but without the ital-
ics.  For the other half, the first italicized clause was replaced by the follow-
ing: “and inflation of 12%.”  The materials then stated that the company
increased the plaintiff’s salary by 5%.  In both conditions, the plaintiff loses
7% of his effective purchasing power, but in the second one he experiences a
pay raise, while in the first one he experiences a pay cut.
We asked both groups of judges the following: “Based solely on this
information, how would you decide the case?”  We then gave them the choice
of defendant or plaintiff.  Unlike our previous study of reference depen-
dence, this version required judges to interpret a contract term, and hence
make a legal judgment.
2. Results
The judges expressed reference-dependent choices.  Among the judges
who evaluated the 7% salary reduction, 45% (nine out of twenty) concluded
that the reduction was unfair.  In contrast, none of the twenty judges who
evaluated the increase concluded that it was unfair.  This difference was sta-
tistically significant.181
3. Discussion
Reference dependence influenced the judges’ assessments of the con-
tract in our scenario.  In both versions, the judges assessed whether a 7% loss
in real income would constitute a “fair salary” within the terms of the agree-
ment.  When that 7% consisted of a reduction in pay, nearly half of the
judges ruled that the defendant had failed to satisfy the contract terms.  But
all of the judges determined that merely failing to keep pace with inflation
was consistent with the defendant’s contractual obligations.  In the effect, the
money illusion influenced the judges’ interpretations of the contract, which
essentially duplicates the results obtained by Kahneman et al. with lay people
in a nonlegal setting.182  The legal setting did not allow the judges to avoid
falling prey to a reference-dependent perspective.
To be sure, the materials were brief.  A real case would naturally involve
a great deal more information.  The materials, however, provided the essen-
tial facts.  The only issue was whether the salary offered was consistent with
the contractual obligation to provide a “fair salary.”  The most relevant infor-
181 Fisher’s Exact Test, p < .001.
182 See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text.
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mation was the change from the initial salary and the rate of inflation, which
we provided.  Judges might have felt that the local economic conditions were
not relevant, perhaps thinking that the company could move.  If so, then the
judges might have assessed the salary against the current low national rate of
inflation.  Although we cannot rule that out, the materials suggest that the
local conditions provide the standard against which the fairness of the salary
is sensibly measured.  Furthermore, the result is consistent with the previous
study of administrative law judges.  The salary reduction simply seemed worse
to the judges than a failure to keep pace with inflation.  To paraphrase Jus-
tice Breyer, not all judges are economists.
B. Study 2: Breach of Contract (Reference Dependence #2)
Would judges express a reference-dependent aversion to losses in a
more complex setting?  As noted above, Wilkinson-Ryan and Hoffman elic-
ited a reference-dependent reaction to breach of contract in a commercial
setting.183  They showed that lay adults judged a contractor more harshly for
breaking a contract to undertake a more lucrative job than when the contrac-
tor broke the contract to avoid incurring a loss.184  Both are conceptually the
same—the breaching party was able to perform but was economically better
off by breaching—but the research participants reacted less negatively to the
contractor trying to avoid incurring a loss than to the one trying to obtain
greater profit.  Whether the contractor sought to obtain a gain or to avert a
loss influenced how the research subjects judged the contractor’s behavior,
even though the amount at stake was identical.  Would judges do the same?
1. Methods and Materials
To test whether frame of reference influences judges evaluating breach
of contract claims, we adapted the materials that Wilkinson-Ryan and Hoff-
man used with lay adults and presented them to judges.185  The materials
stated that the plaintiff had contracted to pay the defendant $12,000 to
install flooring in a house he was trying to sell.  The materials indicated that
the plaintiff (a real estate professional) would earn a $20,000 bonus upon the
sale of the residence if the floors were restored by the time of sale.  They also
indicated that the defendant expected to earn $1,000 profit from the job.
The defendant failed to perform the contract for one of two different rea-
sons.  For half of the judges, the defendant abandoned the job upon learning
that the price of the flooring was higher than expected, and so the job would
actually cost $1,000, rather than net a $1,000 profit.  For the other half, the
defendant abandoned the job upon getting an offer to perform a more lucra-
tive job that would net $1,000 more in profit than the job for the plaintiff.
The defendant thus breached the contract either to avoid a $1,000 loss or to
obtain a $1,000 gain.  The plaintiff had to sell the residence without the new
183 Wilkinson-Ryan & Hoffman, supra note 81, at 1028–30.
184 Id. at 1029–30.
185 Id.
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flooring and the buyers posted negative commentary about the plaintiff on
the internet.  The plaintiff thus sought damages for the lost bonus and harm
to his reputation.  We asked the judges to determine an appropriate damage
award.
We gave these materials to four groups of judges: forty state trial judges
attending an educational conference sponsored by the California judicial
institute in San Diego; 89 Ohio municipal and county judges attending their
annual educational conference; 119 Minnesota state judges attending their
annual judicial education conference; and 12 New York judges attending a
regional educational conference.
2. Results
The judges reacted differently to the two versions.  The judges who read
that the defendant had breached the contract to avoid a loss (124 judges)
awarded an average of $8,000 as compared to an average of $10,400 among
the judges who read that the defendant had breached to obtain a gain (121
judges).186  This difference was marginally significant.187
3. Discussion
The variation in the defendant’s frame of reference influenced the
judges.  Judges were more sympathetic to a contractor trying to avoid a loss
than to a contractor trying to obtain a greater gain.  This result is perhaps not
surprising—the contractor trying to obtain a better deal probably seemed
greedy, whereas the contractor trying to avoid a loss seemed desperate.  Nev-
ertheless, both contractors in our two scenarios were making economically
similar decisions.  Both broke the contract to improve their economic condi-
tion by $1,000.  The psychology of framing, however, predicts that the poten-
tial loss will hurt more than the potential gain will please, and hence
breaching to avoid a loss was more understandable to the judges.
Even considering the influence of framing, the result is somewhat sur-
prising.  Our scenario does not ask the judges to punish the defendant for
the breach of contract, nor does contract law provide for punishment under
these circumstances.188  The judges should have identified a damage award
that put the plaintiff in the same position he would have been had the defen-
dant performed the contract.  Had the defendant performed, the plaintiff
would have earned an extra $8,000 on the sale of the residence and avoided
negative reviews.  Neither anger nor empathy toward the defendant has any
bearing on these values.  In other contexts, we have found that judges’ emo-
186 Four of the judges in the gain condition and three of the judges in the loss condi-
tion did not respond.
187 t(122) = 1.92, p = .06.  Many judges settled on a few common responses: $0, $8000,
and $20,000, and hence we also assessed the results with a nonparametric test, the Mann-
Whitney U Test.  The results were also marginally significant: z = 1.86, p = .06.
188 Punitive damages are not typically available for breach of contract. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
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tional reactions can leak into their judgments.189  We suspect the same mech-
anism is at play here—antipathy for the defendant’s greed in breaching the
contract to earn an extra profit inclined the judges to award more to the
plaintiff (or sympathy for the defendant’s effort to avoid a loss inclined the
judges to award less).
Although the judges in our study reacted to the frame, their reaction was
less dramatic than that of the lay adults in the study Wilkinson-Ryan and
Hoffman conducted.190  That difference suggests that judges might be less
sensitive to frame, but other factors may be at work.  Their materials did not
request a damage award, but used a first-person perspective.191  That is, they
asked their subjects to imagine that they had been the victims of the breach
and to identify what they should obtain in compensation.  Second, their sub-
jects were not necessarily lawyers, and thus probably did not know that con-
tract law limits recovery under these circumstances to compensation for
economic loss.
As an alternative account of our results, judges might have been reacting
to a difference in contract law that arises from contrast effects.  Promisors
need not fulfill their contractual obligations if their performance has become
impracticable.192  Breaking a contract to avoid an extreme, unexpected loss
is thus acceptable.  No similar doctrine exists to come to the aid of a party
who breaches to earn extra profits.193  Although the unexpected loss in the
contract is not sufficient to sustain a defense of impracticability,194 the judges
might have reacted more favorably to the defendant facing a loss because the
materials reminded them of impracticability, which treats losses differently
from gains.  Thus in this area, the law itself seems to reflect a reference
dependence.
C. Study 3: Mutual Mistake (Status Quo Bias #1)
Other aspects of contract law do not distinguish between gains and
losses.  For example, the doctrine of mutual mistake allows parties to rescind
a transaction when the “mistake of both parties at the time a contract was
made as to a basic assumption on which the contract was made has a material
effect on the agreed exchange of performances.”195  The standard is the
same regardless of whether the supposed mistake has induced a seller to sell
189 Wistrich et al., Heart Versus Head, supra note 169, at 911 (“[W]hen the law is unclear,
the facts are disputed, or judges possess wide discretion their decisions can be influenced
by their feelings about litigants.”).
190 Wilkinson-Ryan & Hoffman, supra note 81, at 1028–30.
191 See id. at 1029.
192 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
193 See Wilkinson-Ryan & Hoffman, supra note 81, at 1028–29.
194 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261, cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
(“[M]ere market shifts or financial inability do not usually effect discharge under the rule
stated in this Section.”).
195 Id. § 152(1).
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an item below its true value or a buyer to purchase an item at well above its
true value.
We suspect, however, that the law on the ground differs somewhat from
the doctrine.  Sellers who mistakenly believe they are selling a low-value item
that has hidden value are in a different frame from buyers who mistakenly
pay too much for a low-value item.  By undervaluing an item, a seller foregoes
a potential gain from a more lucrative sale.  Restoring the status quo enables
them to realize that gain.  In contrast, a buyer who overvalues an item incurs
a loss.  Restoring them to the status quo allows them to avoid a loss.  Inas-
much as people do not react as strongly to foregone gains as they do to losses
in contracts,196 courts probably feel greater sympathy toward someone who
overpaid for an item than someone who sold it for less than it was worth.  A
seller who has foolishly sold a valuable painting for a pittance because she
thought it was a worthless trinket is surely disappointed, but not as disap-
pointed as a buyer who has paid a fortune for what turns out to be a forgery.
1. Methods and Materials
To test whether the frame of foregone gains versus losses affects judges
evaluating a commercial dispute, we presented a contract dispute to fifty-one
Utah state trial judges attending their annual educational conference.  The
judges each saw one version of a contract dispute between the seller and
buyer of a vintage, collectable video game.  One of the parties was suing to
rescind the contract based on a mutual mistake.  The basic facts were as
follows:
The case actually involves two video games.  One, called “Family Fitness
Stadium Events,” was created in the early 1980s for the original Nintendo
video game system.  It was made by a long defunct company called Bandai
and has been called the “Holy Grail of video game collectors.”  Only 200
copies of this game were ever sold and its odd, amusing graphics have capti-
vated the imagination of those who collect vintage video games.  It is
extremely rare and worth a great deal.  “Family Fitness” is easily confused
with the other video game at issue in this case, called “Nintendo Fitness,”
which is extremely common and worth very little.
The plaintiff and the defendant both attended a large convention of
collectors who buy and sell vintage video games, comic books, and related
memorabilia in Salt Lake City.  They both rented booths at the convention
at which they offered videos from their collections for sale.  They also
bought items from other collectors at the convention.
For half of the judges, the materials then stated a case of foregone gains
by the seller (who then sues to rescind):
The plaintiff had placed the game in question among a set of bargain games,
and offered it for sale for $1, as the plaintiff believed it was the common
“Nintendo Fitness” game.  The defendant spotted the game and bought it
196 See Wilkinson-Ryan & Hoffman, supra note 81, at 1028–30.
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on a whim.  The next day, the defendant took the game to an expert and
learned that it is the “Family Fitness” game and is worth $38,000.
The other half of the judges read facts suggesting that the mistake had
created a loss for the buyer (who then sues to rescind):
The defendant had placed the game in question among a set of high-end
games, and offered it for sale for $38,000, as the defendant believed it was
the “Family Fitness” game.  The plaintiff spotted the game and bought it on
a whim.  The next day, the plaintiff took the game to an expert and learned
that it is the common “Nintendo Fitness” game and is worth only $1.
The materials then stated that the only issue in the case is whether the
parties have made a mutual mistake that would justify rescission.  The materi-
als identify the rule concerning rescission as stated in the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts and then indicate that the parties have filed cross motions for
summary judgment.  The materials then asked the judges to decide in favor
of one party or the other.  Specifically, in the foregone gains condition, the
materials requested the judges to check one of the following:
___ I would grant the plaintiff’s motion and require the defendant to return
the game.
___ I would grant the defendant’s motion and allow him to keep the game.
In the loss condition, the materials ask the judges to check one of the
following:
___ I would grant the plaintiff’s motion and require the defendant to return
the $38,000.
___ I would grant the defendant’s motion and allow him to keep the
$38,000.
2. Results
The frame had a large effect on the judges’ decisions.  Among judges
viewing the case as involving a foregone gain, only 41% (13 out of 32) indi-
cated they would rescind the contract.  Among judges viewing the case as
involving losses, however, 82% (14 out of 17)197 indicated they would rescind
the contract.  The difference was statistically significant.198
3. Discussion
The frame influenced how judges assessed the claim for rescission.  The
majority of judges assessing the disappointed seller concluded that “a deal is
a deal,” and let the transaction stand.  The vast majority of the judges came to
the rescue of the disappointed buyer, however.  In both cases, the facts sup-
porting the claim for rescission were identical.  The materials indicated that
the parties were unaware of the game’s true identity at the time of sale.  The
197 Two of the judges in the loss condition did not respond.  All of the judges in the
foregone gain condition responded.
198 Fisher’s Exact Test, p = .007.  The sample size was too small to run a demographic
analysis: most of the judges were Republican and male.
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nature of the transaction, a whimsical purchase at the video game equivalent
of a flea market, suggested that the parties might be taking their chances.
These factors are present in both the foregone gains and losses scenarios,
however.  The loss nevertheless presented a more compelling case for rescis-
sion for the judges.
We also tested this scenario with a group of arbitrators and found similar
results.199  Arbitrators, like judges, were more solicitous of the claims of the
disappointed buyer than the disappointed seller.
To be sure, the judges might have read other facts into the scenarios.
The judges might have suspected fraud on the part of the seller in the loss
frame, in that the seller placed the video game among highly valuable collect-
ables.  By contrast, the placement of the game in the bargain bin in the fore-
gone gains frame suggests a plaintiff who simply wants to unload his
inventory and is willing to take his chances.  Although that is possible, the
materials make no such suggestion.  Rather, the facts clearly stated that both
parties were mistaken and that neither of them had any real understanding
of the game’s value.  The loss just hurts more than the foregone gain and
motivates the judges to make a different ruling.
D. Study 4: Hiring and Firing Decisions (Status Quo Bias #2)
Failing to land a job is often a disappointment, but it is not apt to be as
dispiriting as losing a job.  Reasons for this divergence exist, of course, just as
reasons support protecting any status quo.200  Employment means a steady
stream of income that an employee might be counting on for rent or mort-
gage payments, whereas an applicant for a position is unlikely to begin adjust-
ing her lifestyle for a position she has not yet secured.  Failing to obtain a job
and losing one have much in common, however.  Both likely imply some
measure of failure or inadequacy.  Both mean that an applicant must look for
work.  The income stream one could have obtained from employment can be
as valuable as the income stream lost due to a termination.  Numerous stud-
ies, however, show that framing influences how people think about
employment.
Some areas of law distinguish between the loss of employment and the
failure to obtain employment.  Notably, when the position is a government
job, due process protections can apply to termination, but not to the failure
to hire.201  These cases reflect a corollary to the distinction between appli-
cants for government benefits as opposed to those already receiving such
199 Rebecca K. Helm et al., Are Arbitrators Human? 13 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 666,
677–81 (2016).
200 Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 88, at 33–35 (offering rational reasons for
status quo bias).
201 Compare Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (finding implied property enti-
tlement to job tenure, protected by due process for state college teacher who had com-
pleted ten one-year contracts), with Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (rejecting
property rights claim of college professor not renewed after single one-year contract). Cf.
Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 606 (2008) (“[R]ecognition of a class-of-one
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benefits.202  The Supreme Court has never held that an applicant for benefits
triggers the existence of the due process protection.203  Practicality might be
the key motivation behind this distinction, but it echoes the distinction
between gains and losses.
Employment discrimination law, however, does not distinguish between
application for a position and termination (or promotion).  Firms may not
use membership in a protected class (race, sex, and, in some states, sexual
orientation) as a basis for terminating an employee, nor may they use mem-
bership in a protected class as a basis for making hiring (or promotion) deci-
sions.204  The distinction between employment discrimination law and due
process law here perhaps arises from the different purposes that these areas
of law serve.  Employment discrimination law is intended to benefit those
individuals who are potential victims of invidious discrimination, just as due
process protection protects individuals from arbitrary treatment by govern-
ment officials.  Antidiscrimination law, however, is also intended to rid the
workplace of discrimination and provide equal opportunity to people of all
races and sexes.  It thus serves a broader social function that it could not
fulfill if it were limited to providing remedies to those who are already
employed.
Social policy underlying antidiscrimination law, however, might clash
with the intuitions about employment that framing creates.  Applicants who
have failed to secure a position have a different status quo from employees
who have been discharged.  Losing a job might evoke more of a reaction
from judges than being denied one.  Even apart from framing, it might be
more difficult for an applicant to obtain evidence sufficient to support their
claim relative to a discharged employee.  Applicants are not on the inside of
companies and hence are not privy to the internal workings of how a firm
operates in the way that existing employees are, and thus might not even
recognize that they are the victims of discrimination.  Employment discrimi-
nation suits overall have low success rates for plaintiffs,205 and the extra diffi-
culty of not even knowing where to look for evidence might be enough to
theory of equal protection in the public employment context . . . is simply contrary to the
concept of at-will employment.”).
202 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
203 See Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105, 115 (2d Cir. 2005) (“The Supreme Court has
repeatedly reserved decision on the question of whether applicants for benefits (in contra-
distinction to current recipients of benefits) possess a property interest protected by the Due
Process Clause.”).
204 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice
for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin . . . .” (emphasis added)).
205 See Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs
Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 443 (2004) (“The most significant
observation about the deciding of cases, then, is the long-run lack of success at trial for
employment discrimination plaintiffs, relative to other plaintiffs.”).
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deter applicants from pursing claims.  But we suspect that even if all else is
equal, applicants who are the victims of discrimination face worse prospects
for successfully pursuing discrimination claims than discharged employees.
1. Methods and Materials
To test our thesis, we presented a hypothetical case involving an employ-
ment discrimination issue to 146 Florida trial judges.206  The materials asked
the judges to “[i]magine that you are presiding in a bench trial of the follow-
ing employment discrimination lawsuit.”  It then described a potential lawsuit
arising from age discrimination.  The materials set up the lawsuit as follows:
Frank Porter, a 61-year-old man, filed a complaint with the Florida Com-
mission on Human Relations under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992,
asserting that he was the victim of age discrimination at the hands of
Gatorville College, a small private college.  The Commission, overburdened
with other complaints, failed to investigate the allegations within 180 days of
the complaint, so pursuant to section 760.11 of the Act, Porter retained
counsel and filed suit against Gatorville College under section 760.10 of the
Act, which makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate on the basis of
age (and other protected statuses).
For half of the judges, the materials indicated that the plaintiff was one
of five applicants for a resident director position at a dormitory and was not
hired.  For the other half, the materials indicated that the plaintiff was one of
five residential directors faced with a layoff due to an effort to reduce the
number of staff—and he was let go.  The materials went on as follows:
The facts presented at trial are as follows.  [hire: Porter was one of five
applicants for four “Resident Director” positions at four dormitories at
Gatorville College / fire: Porter was one of five Resident Directors at
Gatorville College, which sought to reduce its Resident Director staff from
five to four.]  All of the [hire: applicants / fire: Resident Directors] held
similar educational and professional credentials.  The College chose [hire:
not to hire / fire: to discharge] Porter, contending that he did not have the
interpersonal and staff management skills of the other applicants.  Porter
contends that the real reason he was [hire: not hired / fire: discharged] is
because of his age.  In support of this argument, he points out that the [hire:
other four applicants, each of whom was hired / fire:  other four resident
directors, each of whom was retained], are all under 30, while he is 61.  He
also produced notes from the central administration supervisor with whom
he met.  Next to Porter’s name, the supervisor’s notes read, “Energy?
Understanding of today’s college students?”
Finally, the materials for all judges asked for a determination on the
merits:
To establish the Defendant’s liability for age discrimination, the Plain-
tiff must show that his age was a “substantial or motivating factor” that
prompted the Defendant’s decision [hire: not to hire him / fire: to fire
206 This was roughly half of the judges in attendance at the conference.  The other half
received a hypothetical meant to test a different issue.
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him].  Based solely on the facts reported above, would you find for the plain-
tiff or the defendant?
2. Results
Among those judges who reviewed the failure to hire, 14% (10 out of
69) found for the plaintiff, as compared to 30% (22 out of 74) among those
judges who reviewed the firing version.207  This difference was statistically
significant.208
3. Discussion
Consistent with the variation in frame, judges treated hiring differently
from firing.  More judges found that age had a substantial or motivating
effect on the decision to fire the plaintiff than for failing to hire him, even
though the facts were identical.  Although the law is identical, the judges
treated the cases differently.  The practical effect of this disparity is that the
judges needed more evidence to support an age discrimination claim for a
failure to hire than for a termination.
To be sure, judges could have interpreted the facts differently in the two
scenarios.  The notes indicating that the plaintiff might have lacked energy
or understanding of today’s students might have a different meaning when
written about an applicant than an existing employee whose actual perform-
ance can be evaluated.  That said, it is not clear why such a difference would
have made the judges more solicitous of the claim by the existing employee.
A statement that an older candidate might lack energy is apt to be based on
impressions and stereotypes, whereas such a statement about an existing
employee could be based on actual observations of him in the workplace.
Therefore, the judges should have been more suspicious of such a statement
in the hiring scenario than in the firing scenario.  We suspect that judges are
simply more protective of existing employees than of applicants.
E. Study 5: Medical Malpractice (Endowment Effect #1)
The most extreme differences between gains and losses occur with bod-
ily integrity.209  Valuation studies of public safety suggest that people who are
willing to pay only modest sums for increased safety or security also demand
enormous compensation for a comparable reduction in safety or security.210
The endowment effect tends to be larger for possessions that have a personal
component.211
207 Three judges in the “fire” condition did not respond; all judges in the “hire” condi-
tion responded.
208 Fisher’s Exact Test, p = .04.
209 See Viscusi et al., supra note 113, at 477.
210 See Ritov et al., supra note 113, at 146–47.
211 See ZAMIR, supra note 33, at 26–27 (“When owning an object becomes part of one’s
self-definition, a self-serving bias . . . likely results in an increased valuation of the
object . . . .”).
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The variation between gains and losses appears to influence decisions in
a legal context as well.  McCaffery, Kahneman, and Spitzer showed that peo-
ple asked how much compensation would be necessary to make them whole
after an injury provide vastly smaller dollar amounts than those asked how
much would be necessary for them to allow a defendant to injure them in the
same way.212  The former reflects the gain frame—a plaintiff who has suf-
fered a loss is seeking to improve their status quo, while the latter question
asks subjects to price a loss.  The participants apparently felt that much more
money was necessary to make them willing to incur the loss than was neces-
sary to restore the status quo for a loss already incurred.  We wondered
whether judges would also react the same way.
1. Methods and Materials
To test whether judges similarly perceive a distinction between losses
and gains in personal injury cases, we constructed a hypothetical case involv-
ing medical malpractice to present to trial judges.  We presented the hypo-
thetical to 199 judges: 71 newly elected trial judges in New York State; 16
federal judges in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota; and
112 judges attending the 2015 American Judges Association Annual Confer-
ence.  The judges were mostly trial court judges.213
Our materials described a case of medical malpractice involving eyesight
in which the plaintiff, Cliff Roberts, had developed an infection in both of his
eyes after ocular surgery.  The materials stated that an “inquiry revealed that
a nurse had mistakenly brought surgical equipment into the operating room
that had just been used on a patient with a staph infection.”  The defendant
hospital admitted that it was liable for the infection and its consequences.  It
disputed only the amount of damages.  The materials described the plaintiff
as follows:
Roberts is 34 years old, married, and has two young children (ages 4
and 2).  He continues to hold an office job in the company where he once
worked as a welder.  He has learned to read Braille and, with the aid of a
special computer, has mastered basic accounting skills.  He is thus able to
support himself and his family.  He has lost the ability to drive, of course,
and has difficulty getting around by himself.  He has also lost the ability to
engage in his favorite sports and hobbies, which had included skiing, paint-
ing, and tennis.  Roberts has begun psychotherapy for depression and has
had little interest in replacing these activities with others that he can manage
while blind.  He claims that his marriage has also suffered since the surgery
and that he cannot find meaningful ways to engage with his children.
The materials indicated that the parties had settled on an amount for
“all economic damages” but could not agree on the amount for “lost enjoy-
ment of life.”  Roberts’s complaints were that he has lost his favorite hobbies,
212 McCaffery et al., supra note 118, at 1355–59 (describing experiment and results).
213 Twenty of the judges at the American Judges Association and two of the Minnesota
judges were appellate judges; the rest of the judges were trial court judges.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-2\NDL202.txt unknown Seq: 40 27-DEC-18 9:19
560 notre dame law review [vol. 94:2
he [has become] depressed, and his home life has deteriorated since he lost
his vision.  For its part, the defendant asserted that “most blind people
develop interests that do not depend on sight (including forms of skiing).”  It
also contended that “for most people, blindness is not an impediment to a
successful marriage or family life.”
All of the judges received that information, but we created a variation
that manipulated the frame of the plaintiff’s injury.  For half of the judges,
the materials described a “foregone gain.”  They stated that “Roberts was a
skilled welder who suffered severe damage to the retinas in both of his eyes
during a freak explosion on a job site four years earlier.”  Then they noted
that a surgical treatment that would restore his eyesight completely had
become available, but that due to the infection, the treatment would not
work and his sight could never be restored.  We asked these judges the fol-
lowing: “Based on these facts, how much would you award Roberts for the
lost enjoyment of life attributable to the hospital negligently failing to restore
his sight?”
For the other half of the judges, the case presented the injury as a loss.
The materials stated that the plaintiff had been diagnosed as having “a rare
disease that had begun to cause the retinas in both of his eyes to degenerate
slowly” and had the potential to cause long term loss of his vision.  The
materials indicated that a surgical procedure was available to avoid the risk of
losing his vision.  He then contracted the same infection as described in the
gain frame, causing him to lose his vision permanently.  We asked these
judges the following: “Based on these facts, how much would you award Rob-
erts for the lost enjoyment of life attributable to the hospital negligently caus-
ing him to lose his sight?”
In effect, the plaintiff either failed to regain his sight due to the hospi-
tal’s negligence or lost it due to the hospital’s negligence.
2. Results
Table 2 presents the results.  The judges expressed an endowment effect
for eyesight.  Among 92 judges imposing damages for a failure to recover the
plaintiff’s vision, the average award was just over $4 million (with a median of
$1.5 million), as compared to $5 million ($2.5 million median) among the 98
judges imposing damages for the loss of the plaintiff’s vision.  This difference
was statistically significant.214
214 The data were highly positively skewed.  Hence, we analyzed the data in two ways.
First, we used a nonparametric comparison, the Mann-Whitney U Test, which was signifi-
cant: z = 1.99, p < .05.  Second, we assessed various transformations of the data to obtain a
normal distribution: the fourth root of the awards was the closest.  A t-test (assuming iden-
tical variance among the two samples) on the fourth root approached statistical signifi-
cance. t(188) = 1.68, p < .10.
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TABLE 2:  AVERAGE AND QUARTILES OF THE AWARD BY CONDITION
(foregone gain versus loss), in thousands of dollars
Condition (n) Average 25th Percentile Median 75th Percentile
Gain (92) 4,174 1,000 1,500 5,000
Loss (98) 5,000 1,000 2,500 5,000
All three groups of the judges expressed the same trend, as Table 2A shows.
TABLE 2A:  AVERAGE AND QUARTILES OF THE AWARD BY CONDITION
(foregone gain versus loss), in thousands of dollars, by judge
group
25th 75th
Judge Condition Mean (n) Percentile Median Percentile
New Gain 6,294 (31) 350 1,200 5,000
NY Loss 6,542 (40) 500 4,000 8,500
MN Gain 1,781(8) 625 1,000 2,750
Loss 5,500 (8) 1,500 5,000 7,500
AJA Gain 3,295 (53) 1,000 1,500 5,000
Loss 3,686 (50) 1,000 2,500 5,000
None of the demographic characteristics we measured (gender, political ori-
entation, experience) had any statistically significant effect on the results.215
3. Discussion
The frame affected how judges assessed the value of eyesight.  The
judges valued the loss of sight as a notably more important harm than the
failure to restore sight.  A lifetime of blindness is a difficult disability to price,
of course.  Judges have no clear metric and no fixed table to consult.  It was
not surprising that the damage awards were erratic.  But the loss was identical
in both versions and caused by the same negligent conduct.  The judges
assigned a greater price to the loss of sight than to the foregone opportunity
to regain vision.
In many contexts, the loss of eyesight might well be more distressing
than the failure to restore a person’s vision.  An individual living without eye-
sight is apt to have adapted to the loss, whereas a person facing the loss of
vision will have to undergo that adaptation.  We tried to address this in our
fact pattern by describing the adaptations that the plaintiff had made to his
blindness.  Both conditions describe his having made a good occupational
215 The analysis of each of these was conducted using ANOVA (ANCOVA for experi-
ence) of the fourth root, with condition, the demographic factor, and an interaction as
independent variables.  A statistically significant interaction term would have indicated that
frame affected the judges with different backgrounds differently, but this term was not
significant for gender (F(1, 166) = 0.57, p = .45), political orientation (F(1, 143) = 0.06, p =
.81), and experience (F(1, 98) = 1.20, p = .27).
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adjustment by learning Braille and securing employment.  These costs, how-
ever, were not part of the judges’ calculus, as the materials indicated that the
hospital and the plaintiff had settled upon an amount for the economic
impact of the injury.  Both also describe him as having continued social and
psychological problems which is the primary component of the remaining
injury.  Thus, although it is possible that the judges reasonably saw the loss
and gain differently, the fact pattern depicts an identical harm.
Like many cognitive processes that can lead to misjudgment, the fram-
ing effect we uncovered in this problem might be the product of a useful way
of thinking that is simply overapplied.  Malpractice cases likely include a
great many more examples of the loss of an ability or the infliction of harm
than the failure to restore some ability.  Courts even struggle to conceptual-
ize a coherent approach to the loss of a chance.216  Our foregone gain scena-
rio thus might have been too unfamiliar, even though the harm was clearly
defined.  Nevertheless, we view these results as a clear extension of the work
done by McCaffery and his colleagues showing that juries experience mark-
edly different reactions to gains and losses in personal injury cases.217  So too
do judges.
F. Study 6: Water Right (Endowment Effect #2)
From an economic perspective, an unconstrained option to take owner-
ship of a commodity is economically equivalent to actual ownership.  People
do not usually treat the option to own as identical to actual ownership, how-
ever.  Once people possess an item, its value seems instantly to grow—a phe-
nomenon that has been dubbed the endowment effect.  Because the option
to own something does not entail its possession, the option does not trigger
the endowment effect, and so people value possession more than options.
1. Methods and Materials
To explore whether judges react differently to options and possession,
we gave judges in New Mexico (144 judges), Canada (36 judges), and Alaska
(24 judges) a hypothetical case involving water rights.  The materials
described a lawsuit by “a large real-estate developer” against a state (or pro-
vincial) agency that manages water rights.  The suit involved the developer’s
water rights, which consisted of either an option to buy water rights or rights
the developer already owned.  In each case the agency exercised its statutory
power to revoke the rights, resulting in a lawsuit by the developer to chal-
lenge the revocation.
The materials indicated that the agency commonly sold the water rights
to private parties, “often at deep discounts to encourage agriculture and
development.”  The developer had obtained rights in an auction by the
agency for water that would only become available “after the construction of
216 See Glen O. Robinson, Probabilistic Causation and Compensation for Tortious Risk, 14 J.
LEGAL STUD. 779 (1985).
217 McCaffery et al., supra note 118, at 1403.
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a new aqueduct next year.”  The water was essential to the developer’s plans
for “a new, 300-unit residential housing development with a golf course.”
The materials stated that the developer’s rights were “subject to realloca-
tion and readjustment in times of scarcity.”  Owing to recent drought condi-
tions, the agency decided to cancel the developer’s rights.  The materials
provided the basis for the developer’s lawsuit challenging this decision as
follows:
The [Agency’s] decisions are subject to judicial review, and [the devel-
oper] has filed suit.  The [Agency’s] factual determinations are subject to
enormous deference and [the developer] does not challenge them.  Rather,
he asserts that it was inappropriate for the [Agency] to privilege other uses
of water over his proposed residential development.  He notes that the
[Agency] allowed several large ranches and farms to retain and even to
expand their water consumption.  He also argued that [the Agency] is
undertaking a new project to divert water to in-stream flow to support trout
fishing in a recreational area.  He admits that his planned golf course would
be a heavy user of water, but notes that domestic consumption accounts for
only a tiny fraction of water used state-wide.
The [Agency’s] determinations must be based on “a reasonable and fair
assessment” of the state’s water needs.  [The developer] argues that the
[Agency] should not have privileged other users and thus should not have
refused to allow him to exercise his option to buy water rights.
The [Agency] contends that its governing regulations allow it broad dis-
cretion to determine appropriate water uses and that [decisions like this are
common.]
For half of the judges, the materials described the developer’s rights as
an option.  In this version, the developer had “obtained an option to buy
water rights that the [Agency] made available for potential use in [a subur-
ban area].”  The materials stated that the developer “has paid nothing yet for
the option—he won the auction by committing to pay the most for the water
once the option is exercised.”  Cancelling his rights maintained a status quo
in which the developer did not yet own water rights.  When the agency can-
celled his option, however, he lost the opportunity to purchase the rights and
complete his development.  The materials asked judges the following: “Based
on these facts, is your initial impression that [the Agency’s] refusal to allow
[the developer] to exercise his option to buy water rights ‘reasonable and
fair?’”
For the other half of the judges, the materials described the developer’s
rights as owned.  They stated that the developer had “purchased water rights
that the [Agency] made available for use in [a suburban area] in an auction”
and that “[h]e won the auction by paying the most for the water.”  Cancelling
his rights altered the status quo by eliminating the developer’s rights.
Because the agency refunded the money he paid for the rights, however, his
economic position was identical to that of the version in which the option
was at issue.  The consequences of cancelling the developer’s ownership were
also the loss of his ability to complete his development.  The materials asked
judges the following: “Based on these facts, is your initial impression that [the
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Agency’s] decision to cancel [the developer’s] water rights is ‘reasonable and
fair?’”
2. Results
Judges treated the option differently than ownership.  Among the 103
judges who evaluated the option, 87.4% (90 judges) affirmed the agency’s
decision, as opposed to 75.8% of the judges (75 out of 99) who evaluated
ownership.218  This difference was statistically significant.219  None of the
demographic variables influenced judgment significantly.220
3. Discussion
Judges were more solicitous of ownership claims than claims to the
option to own.  In our hypothetical, the real-estate developer in both versions
was in an identical economic position.  In the option version the agency
rescinded his right to buy the water he needed for his development, and in
the ownership version the agency essentially bought the rights back from him
involuntarily.  He ends up with his cash but with no rights in both cases.  And
yet, something about ownership itself made the judges more hesitant to sup-
port the agency.
To be sure, the variation we observed was not large—the difference was
only an 11.4 percentage-point shift.  These materials, however, created a
stringent test for the effect of framing, as most of the judges deferred to the
agency.  The easy decision for judges would have been to defer to an expert
agency that cited serious water shortages as a basis for its choice.  Particularly
because the materials are abbreviated—not to mention only hypothetical—
deference was an attractive option.  The loss entailed by the rescission of the
218 One judge in each condition did not respond.
219 Fisher’s Exact Test, p = .04.
220 Judges in all three jurisdictions expressed the same trend: In New Mexico, 85%
versus 75% of the judges supported the agency, respectively, in the option and ownership
conditions; in Alaska the difference was 91% versus 83%; in Canada the difference was
94% versus 74%.  Among Democratic judges, 86% (44 out of 51) favored the agency when
evaluating options and 76% (38 out of 50) when evaluating ownership; among Republican
judges this difference was 85% (17 out of 20) versus 69% (11 out of 16).  (The Canadian
judges were not part of this analysis, of course.)  The small disparity between the groups
was not significant in a logistic regression: z = .27, p = .79.  More experienced judges did
not react differently from their younger counterparts.  (This analysis was conducted with
logistic regression of the decision on the frame, years of experience, and an interaction
term of frame and years of experience.  The latter term was not significant: z = .02, p = .99.)
Female judges showed no difference between the two versions; 89% of the female judges in
each condition (33 out of 37 in the option condition and 31 out of 35 in the ownership
condition) upheld the agency’s decision as compared to 86% (56 out of 65) versus 68%
(43 out of 63) among the male judges.  The disparity between male and female judges,
however, was not statistically significant.  (This analysis was conducted with logistic regres-
sion of the decision on the frame, gender, and an interaction term of frame and gender.
The latter term was not significant: z = 1.14, p = .25.)
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property right nevertheless induced the judges to question the agency more
than when just the rescission of an option was at stake.
Although we designed the two versions to be economically identical,
judges might have factored the probability that the developer will actually
carry out the project into their assessment.  By its nature, the option entailed
an extra step before the developer began using the water.  Perhaps judges
worried that the developer would not be able to raise the funds to buy the
water rights—a concern that was not an issue in the ownership condition.
The extra possibility that the developer might not have needed the water
rights might have led the judges to feel that they needed to protect the devel-
oper with less vigor.  The materials themselves, however, gave no hint of this
possibility.  The primary difference between the two conditions was whether
the developer owned the entitlement or merely had the option to own it.  It
was a difference that mattered to the judges, even though it was economically
irrelevant.
G. Study 7: Products Liability (Risk Seeking to Avoid Losses #1)
Do judges also treat risk differently when it is framed as losses as
opposed to gains?  To test this, we presented three different scenarios in
which judges had to evaluate risky choices.  We found that judges’ proclivity
to accept risk varied with the frame.  Would judges also react to the frame in
a similar way?  Would they be more sympathetic to a risky choice in a loss
frame than a gain frame?
1. Methods and Materials
To determine whether judges react to risk differently depending on a
variation in frame, we presented a hypothetical case similar to the Asian dis-
ease problem to two groups of judges.  One consisted of 139 federal magis-
trate judges attending an annual educational conference put on by the
Federal Judicial Center.  The other consisted of 74 judges attending the
annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit.  The latter group (unlike all of our other judges) included
appellate as well as trial judges, but we treated all judges as the same for the
purposes of our analysis.
Our materials mimicked the setting of the Asian disease problem by ask-
ing judges to evaluate the decision of a large pharmaceutical manufacturer.
We asked the judges to:
Imagine that you are a judge presiding over a bench trial of a products
liability lawsuit.  The plaintiffs are numerous foreign nationals who are suing
the manufacturer of a vaccine designed to combat the outbreak of an unu-
sual strain of Dengue Fever in equatorial countries in Africa.  Assume that
jurisdiction in U.S. Courts is appropriate and that the manufacturer is liable
if the drug design was defective.  Public health officials at the United Nations
concluded that this illness would have killed 600 people before conventional
public health programs brought it under control.  Fortunately, a vaccine was
developed quickly.  A United Nations program administered the vaccine to
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millions of people in just a few months, thereby quickly containing the
outbreak.
Unfortunately, the vaccine did not save all 600 people from the illness.
The drug company that manufactured the vaccine faced two alternative
designs.  At the time the drug company had to make a choice about the
vaccine, the estimates of the effect of the vaccines were as follows:
To mimic the “gains” frame, we presented the choice as follows:
Vaccine A: 200 people would be saved from the illness.
Vaccine B: 1/3 probability that all 600 people would be saved and a 2/3
probability that no one would be saved.
To mimic the “loss” frame, we presented the choice in this way:
Vaccine A: 400 people would die from the illness.
Vaccine B: 1/3 probability that no one would die from the illness and a 2/3
probability that all 600 would die from the illness.
We then informed the judges that:
The drug company chose vaccine A without disclosing the alternative
design to public health officials.  This lawsuit arises from the death of several
people who took the vaccine and nevertheless died from the illness.  The
plaintiffs alleged that the choice of design was unreasonable, rendering the
drug defective.  They contend that the drug company should have used vac-
cine B, arguing that the alternative design [gains: could have saved 400 more
people. / losses: left 400 people to die from the illness.]  Public health
experts disagree on which vaccine was appropriate.
The materials then asked the judges: “Liability turns on the issue of
whether the drug company made the reasonable choice when selecting vac-
cine A.  What is your opinion?”  The judges had the option to select:
____ Vaccine A was the appropriate choice.
____ Vaccine B was the appropriate choice.
2. Results
When evaluating the options from the gain perspective, 91% of the
judges (96 out of 105) identified the certain choice (vaccine A) as the appro-
priate option.  By contrast, when evaluating the options from the loss per-
spective, only 74% (71 out of 96) selected the certain option as more
attractive.221  This difference was statistically significant.222
3. Discussion
Describing the choice of a drug company as involving lives lost as
opposed to lives gained influenced the judges’ assessments.  Although the
judges overwhelmingly regarded the drug company’s choice as appropriate
221 Six of the judges in the gains condition and six judges in the losses condition did
not respond.
222 Fisher’s Exact Test, p = .001.
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regardless of the frame, more judges thought that the drug company’s choice
was inappropriate in the loss frame.  The judges likely reacted to the varia-
tion in how the problem highlights lives saved as opposed to lives sacrificed.
The gains version affirmatively states that it saves 200 people, thereby shadow-
ing the fact that it sacrifices 400.  The loss frame, however, highlights the
certain deaths of 400 people, making it seem less compelling.
To be sure, we did not ask these judges to decide whether the drug com-
pany was liable.  We were concerned that doing so would have required
much more detail than we could provide.  Nevertheless, we suggested to the
judges that their assessment of appropriateness was related to the issue of
liability, as it would be in a design-defect products liability suit.  Hence, even
though we did not ask them for an ultimate ruling, we asked the judges a
legally relevant question.
H. Study 8: Framing and Bankruptcy Reorganization
(Risk Seeking to Avoid Losses #2)
Bankruptcy judges constantly make decisions involving risk.  One of the
more common decisions they make is whether to liquidate a business or
allow it to continue operating.  For the creditors, this decision can be charac-
terized as involving either gains or losses.  The decision can appear to involve
gains in that the creditors are certain to recover some of their money if the
business is liquidated; if the business is not liquidated, there is some prospect
that the creditors will recover more in the future.  The decision can appear
to involve losses in that the creditors lose some of the money they were owed
if the business is liquidated; if the business is not liquidated, there is some
prospect that they will lose less in the future.  If framing influences bank-
ruptcy judges the way framing influenced the state court judges in Utah (who
also assessed a commercial context), then they might make different choices
when a business risk is characterized as involving gains as opposed to losses.
1. Methods and Materials
We tested for the framing effect among bankruptcy judges by presenting
113 bankruptcy judges attending an annual conference sponsored by the
Federal Judicial Center with a problem called “Choice Among Reorganiza-
tion Plans.”223  In it, we asked the judges to imagine that they were presiding
over a “Chapter 11 reorganization of a small business”:
You are presiding over a Chapter 11 reorganization of a small business,
“Hammer Time, Inc.”  Hammer Time is a home supply and service business
consisting of a hardware store, a carpet shop, and a contracting business.
Hammer Time’s contracting work is profitable, but the hardware store and
carpet shop are failing.  Several months ago, Hammer Time filed for protec-
tion and reorganization under Chapter 11.  Hammer Time listed debts owed
to suppliers, utilities, landlords, companies from whom it has rented con-
223 The data in this study were previously published in Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Inside
the Bankruptcy Judge’s Mind, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1227, 1237–41 (2006).
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struction equipment, and several subcontractors.  Hammer Time listed
assets such as inventory, office furniture, and construction equipment.  It has
several construction contracts underway that would earn it revenue if it con-
tinued as a going concern.  An immediate liquidation would leave the
unsecured creditors with $600,000 less than they are owed.
You are conducting a confirmation hearing.  Two competing plans for
reorganization have been offered by the unsecured creditors: Plan A and
Plan B.  Each has received a comparable level of support from the unsecured
creditors, but neither has attracted support from holders of two-thirds of the
unsecured debt, as required by 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c).  Both plans, however,
satisfy the other requirements for confirmation.  All of the secured creditors
have agreed to accept either plan.  Under these circumstances, pursuant to
11 U.S.C. § 1129(c), you must “consider the preferences of creditors” and
confirm one of the two plans.
The materials then asked the judge, “Which plan would you choose?”
To create the variation in the frame, we stated the choices in one of two ways.
To create the gains frame, we described the options as follows:
If you select Plan A, $200,000 of the unsecured debt will be paid for sure.
If you select Plan B, there is a 1/3 probability that all of the unsecured debt
will be paid and a 2/3 chance that none of it will be paid.
To create the loss frame, we described the options as follows:
If you select Plan A, $400,000 of the unsecured debt will remain unpaid for
sure.
If you select Plan B, there is a 1/3 probability that none of the unsecured
debt will remain unpaid and a 2/3 probability that all of the unsecured debt
will remain unpaid.
Half of the judges reviewed the “gain” condition and others reviewed a “loss”
condition.
Note that all of these plans have the same expected value of $200,000.
In each version, the only difference between the two options lies in the way
they characterize the risks of each plan, thereby giving the judges little rea-
son to choose one plan over the other.  In both conditions, the judges chose
between the certain outcome that the first plan presents and the risky option
that the second plan presents.  Hence, other than that they describe the
plans as involving gains or losses, the judges had no reason to make different
choices.
2. Results
Among judges evaluating the plans in the gain frame, 91.8% (45 out of
49) preferred Plan A, the certain outcome.  Among judges evaluating the
plans in the loss frame, 73.3% (44 out of 60) preferred Plan A.  In both
instances, the judges favored the certain plan, but we found an 18.5 percent-
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age-point difference between judges in the gain frame versus judges in the
loss frame.  This difference was statistically significant.224
3. Discssusion
The decision frame affected the judges.  The judges preferred the cer-
tain option overall, but this preference was strongest when the options were
framed as gains.  The effect size we found here is similar to the effect size that
we observed in our earlier study of generalist judges’ assessments of settle-
ments in civil lawsuits.  In that study, the variation by frame from gains to
losses shifted the judges’ preferences by fifteen percentage points (40%
favored the certain option in the gain frame and 25% favored the certain
option in the loss frame).  Here, the judges’ preferences shifted by 18.5 per-
centage points.  This result was also comparable to the 17 percentage-point
shift we observed in Study 7.
The problem which we relied upon, much like the Asian disease prob-
lem on which it is based, might be explained without reliance on framing.
The judges could have interpreted Plan A (the certain outcome) as identify-
ing the minimum gain or loss.  That is, in the gain frame, the judges might
have interpreted the phrase “$200,000 of the unsecured debt will be paid for
sure” as meaning “at least $200,000 will be paid.”  Likewise, judges in the loss
frame might have interpreted “$400,000 of the unsecured debt will remain
unpaid for sure” as meaning “at least $400,000 will remain unpaid.”  If so,
Plan A would seem more valuable in the gain frame than in the loss frame.
At least one researcher has offered a similar account of the Asian disease
problem.225  We cannot rule out this interpretation, but given that framing
effects are widely documented and empirically substantiated in a wide variety
of settings, we think that the framing effect provides the most plausible
account of our results.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
These studies demonstrate that framing influences how judges think
about law.  We assessed four different manifestations of framing (reference
dependence, status quo biases, endowment effect, and risk seeking in the
face of losses) and found that all four influenced judges.  Judges consistently
treated choices framed as gains differently from choices framed as losses,
even though the options in all eight studies were economically identical.
Across a wide range of legal issues, judges (just like everyone else) fell prey to
the illusions that framing creates.
The results are remarkable given that framing exerts less influence on
decisions made for others than on decisions made for oneself.226  Even vicari-
224 Fisher’s Exact Test, p = .01.
225 See Mandel, supra note 131, at 56–76.
226 See Fenja V. Ziegler & Richard J. Tunney, Who’s Been Framed? Framing Effects Are
Reduced in Financial Gambles Made for Others, 3 BMC PSYCHOL. 9, 15 (2015) (reporting that
“the relative increase in risk seeking behavior for loss frames is reduced when the decisions
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ous framing works: judges stand to lose or gain nothing personally, but they
adopt the perspective of one litigant and so are affected by the frame all the
same.
Arguments that gain and loss frames are not actually identical pervade
the research on framing,227 and similar arguments can be lodged against
some of our scenarios.  For example, in the mutual mistake scenario, the
judges evaluating the loss frame might have felt that the seller’s pricing the
worthless game at $38,000 constituted a misrepresentation.  Even though we
did not give the judges the option of deciding the case on that basis, they
might have been more inclined to rescind the transaction than the judges in
the gain frame, which presented no similar alternative theory.  Alternative
accounts of our results, however, are idiosyncratic.  The common thread
across all eight scenarios always was that one scenario involved a gain and the
other involved a loss.  The judges consistently treated losses as more signifi-
cant than gains, whether that loss consisted of a financial loss, the loss of
employment, or lost eyesight.  The result is thus perfectly consistent with the
predictions of research on framing.  The parsimonious explanation for the
data overall is that framing matters to judges.
The pervasive influence of frame in our studies supports assertions that
the legal system itself produces arbitrary variations based on frame.  As the
examples at the outset of this paper illustrate,228 from employment law to
cases on federalism, the courts are more solicitous of claims involving losses
than ones involving foregone gains.  Existing rights carry more weight with
judges than claims for novel ones, whether these rights arise from private
contract disputes or public law constitutional claims.  To be sure, courts
should respect people’s settled expectations.  The results in our studies, how-
ever, suggest that the preference for the status quo goes well beyond a rea-
sonable effort to avoid disrupting settled expectations.  In all eight of our
scenarios, the description of the claim as involving a gain as opposed to a loss
is essentially arbitrary.  In many contexts, the party identified as the stake-
holder is also likely arbitrary, but our studies show that the stakeholder will
have the psychological higher ground.
Although we confined our analysis of framing to civil cases, some have
suggested that framing likely influences defendants (and perhaps defense
counsel) in criminal cases.229  It is possible that judges could be influenced
by framing in criminal cases.  For example, if—as is true in some jurisdictions
are made on behalf of other people, relative to when people make the same decisions for
themselves”).
227 See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
228 See supra notes 26–36 and accompanying text.
229 Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2464,
2514 (2004) (“Ordinarily, defendants view plea bargaining through a loss frame: they are
used to being free and are being asked to accept months or years in prison. . . . Not all
defendants view plea bargains through loss frames, however.  A defendant who is in pre-
trial detention is likely to view prison as the baseline and eventual freedom as a gain, par-
ticularly if freedom is possible in weeks or months.”).
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but not in others230—judges are involved in the plea bargaining process,
then judges might favor plea agreements that are framed in an attractive
manner over those that are not, just as we found with respect to civil
settlements.231
In part, law is based upon and intended to serve societal norms and
broadly held moral intuitions.  Framing seems consistent with such norms
and intuitions, and allowing framing to influence legal judgments may pos-
sess some advantages even if it is not economically rational.  If law strays too
far from societal norms and intuitions, then it may lose respect and people
may be less willing to accept it, even if (precisely because it does not exhibit a
framing effect) it is actually more rational.  For example, our results may
dovetail with societal intuitions to be more protective of those fired from jobs
than of disappointed job applicants (Study 4) or to favor those who own
property over those who merely have an option to acquire it (Study 6).
The results offer clear advice for lawyers.  Lawyers will find they have
more persuasive force when describing their client as facing a loss than a lost
opportunity.  Alleged infringements on a right can commonly be described
as a loss from a current position, even if it is truly a foregone gain.  Likewise,
a lawyer on the defense side can reduce the power of a plaintiff’s claim by
characterizing it as a foregone opportunity.  A good deal of advocacy consists
of tilting a client’s position into a psychologically congenial structure, and
framing represents a powerful underlying script that lawyers can (and doubt-
less do) take advantage of.
Given the adversarial nature of our legal system,232 it is tempting to
think that competing uses of psychological illusions will cancel each other
out.  If a plaintiff characterizes her claim as a loss and a defendant character-
izes it as a foregone gain, will some underlying truth emerge?  We have our
doubts for several reasons.  Notably, although we commonly picture trial
court proceedings as consisting of two highly skilled lawyers fighting it out in
front of a judge,233 this picture is not always accurate.  In about one-third of
cases, at least one party is not represented by counsel.234  And in small claims
230 See Nancy J. King & Ronald F. Wright, The Invisible Revolution in Plea Bargaining:
Managerial Judging and Judicial Participation in Negotiations, 95 TEX. L. REV. 325, 326 (2016).
231 Guthrie et al., supra note 159, at 797.
232 Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243 (2008) (“In our adversary system, in
both civil and criminal cases, in the first instance and on appeal, we follow the principle of
party presentation.  That is, we rely on the parties to frame the issues for decision and
assign the courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present.”).
233 See Maurice Rosenberg, Resolving Disputes Differently: Adieu to Adversary Justice?, 21
CREIGHTON L. REV. 801, 810 (1988) (“Probably the commonest caricature of the adversary
concept is a parody that goes: ‘Set two trained legal gladiators against one another, let
them fight, claw and hack at each other until exhaustion and, presto, the truth will
emerge.”).
234 See  Civil Pro Se and Non-Pro Se Filings, by District During 12-Month Period Ending Septem-
ber 30, 2013, ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/statistics_
import_dir/C13Sep13.pdf (last vistied Nov. 17, 2018) (reporting that twenty-seven percent
of civil filings were made by pro se litigants); see also Emily S. Taylor Poppe & Jeffrey J.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-2\NDL202.txt unknown Seq: 52 27-DEC-18 9:19
572 notre dame law review [vol. 94:2
courts, attorneys are forbidden and individuals must represent themselves.235
Judges also must sometimes must decide on an ex parte basis, such as in
applications for a temporary restraining order, vessel arrest, search warrant,
wiretap, arrest warrant, tracking device, or writ of attachment.  Even where
both parties are represented by counsel, the quality of lawyers may be une-
ven.236  Although while some lawyers are excellent, and many are good, some
are deficient.237  Not only are lawyers themselves susceptible to framing,238
and thus unable to appreciate the need for—or lack the ability to accom-
plish—reframing, but the particular lawyer who would benefit from refram-
ing must recognize the danger.
Furthermore, some claims likely more naturally lend themselves to one
position or another.  The fictional Archie Bunker could not grasp the wis-
dom of his son-in-law’s efforts to get him to see past the money illusion, and
often people cannot be debiased.  In the real world, discounts still have more
power than surcharges, even though consumers are constantly exposed to
both.  Similarly, many people who review the Asian disease problem switch
from the safe choice in the gain frame and the risky choice in the loss frame,
even when they view them side by side.239  We suspect that most legal issues
have a natural frame that is difficult to resist.  The first frame presented
might also be the most influential.  Taking a benefit is just not psychologi-
cally the same as the failure to confer a benefit, and the loss of a legal right
will never feel quite the same as the failure to recognize a new right.
Rachlinski, Do Lawyers Matter? The Effect of Legal Representation in Civil Disputes, 43 PEPP. L.
REV. 881, 883 (2016) (“PopPoTrends suggest that pro se litigation is on the rise.”).
235 See Basic Considerations and Questions, CAL. DEP’T CONSUMER AFF., https://
www.dca.ca.gov/publications/small_claims/basic_info.shtml (last visited Nov. 17, 2018)
(“You can’t have the attorney represent you in court.”).
236 Kent Roach, Wrongful Convictions and Criminal Procedure, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 349, 365
(2003) (“The battle theory does not work well when one of the gladiators is inexperienced,
incompetent, woefully under-resourced, drunk or asleep.”); see also Jennifer Bennett
Shinall, Slipping Away from Justice: The Effect of Attorney Skill on Trial Outcomes, 63 VAND. L.
REV. 267 (2010).  The problem of disparity likely is more severe in civil cases than in crimi-
nal cases. See Richard A. Posner & Albert H. Yoon, What Judges Think of the Quality of Legal
Representation, 63 STAN. L. REV. 317, 344 (2011) (“Disparities in resources and quality of
legal representation in criminal cases are tempered by constitutional protections of the
higher burden of proof for the prosecution and the entitlement of the defendant to effec-
tive assistance of counsel.  These constitutional guarantees do not extend to civil cases, to
the potential detriment of poorer litigants.” (footnotes omitted)).  That is, there is no
“floor” in civil cases.
237 William W. Schwarzer, Dealing with Incompetent Counsel—The Trial Judge’s Role, 93
HARV. L. REV. 633, 633 (1980) (“Inadequate performance of trial lawyers has become a
growing concern to the bench, the bar, and the public.”).
238 Andrew J. Wistrich & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, How Lawyers’ Intuitions Prolong Litigation,
86 S. CAL. L. REV. 571, 589–94 (2013).
239 See Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F. West, Individual Differences in Framing and Con-
junction Effects, 4 THINKING & REASONING 289, 295 (1998) (reporting that thirty-one percent
of the subjects in a within-subjects presentation of the Asian disease problem changed
preferences between the frames).
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Although a skilled lawyer might sometimes be able to recharacterize a claim,
one frame will generally have more psychological power than another.
Can judges remedy the erratic choices that framing can produce?
Although frames can be powerful, we suspect judges can do more to recog-
nize the power of the illusions they create.  Awareness of the arbitrariness of
framing is a first step.  Judges who understand that framing can influence
their judgment are at least prepared to address this extralegal influence on
their decisionmaking.  Judges who know that a legal right can be described as
either a gain and as a loss can contemplate their decision from both perspec-
tives.  The oral argument in the Expressions Hair Design, discussed above,240
suggests that some Supreme Court Justices recognize the role that framing
plays in decisionmaking, but does not necessarily reflect an understanding of
how framing will affect them in legal settings.  Judges can also encourage
lawyers to reframe arguments so that they are exposed to both perspectives.
Finally, they can ensure that they are not rushing whenever possible.
Research indicates that susceptibility to framing is caused by uncritical reli-
ance on heuristic processing, which can be exacerbated by time pressure.241
We expect judicial decisions to be consistent, not to vary depending on
superficial redescriptions of options.  Although there are limits to what
judges can do to combat faming, especially when the adversary system mis-
fires, deliberation can help.  “The mind has its illusions as the sense of sight;
and in the same manner as feeling corrects the latter, so reflection and calcu-
lation correct the former.”242
Framing produces a powerful influence on judgment in the legal system.
As the review above indicates, hundreds of studies show how it affects deci-
sionmaking, including decisionmaking in legal settings.  Our research reveals
that framing influences how judges think as well.  Rights at risk of loss draw
more sympathy and attention from judges than foregone rights.  Because
framing influences judges as they craft and interpret law, framing thus likely
accounts for numerous odd asymmetries across a wide range of legal issues.
The path of the law thus might well be bent by the cognitive illusions framing
produces.
240 See supra notes 174–77 and accompanying text.
241 Lisa Guo et al., Thinking Fast Increases Framing Effects in Risky Decision Making, 28
PSYCHOL. SCI. 530, 541 (2017) (reporting that in hypothetical and incentivized choices,
time pressure increased framing effect); see also Mathieu Cassotti et al., Positive Emotional
Context Eliminates the Framing Effect in Decision-Making, 12 EMOTION 926, 930 (2012) (report-
ing that “positive emotional context can reduce loss aversion, and it strongly reinforced the
dual-process view that the framing effect stems from an affective heuristic belonging to
intuitive System 1.”); Yan Sun & Barbara Mellers, Trade—Upgrade Framing Effects: Trades Are
Losses, but Upgrades Are Improvements, 11 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 582 (2016).
242 PIERRE SIMON LAPLACE, A PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY ON PROBABILITIES 160 (Frederick Wil-
son Truscott & Frederick Lincoln Emory trans., John Wiley & Sons 1902) (1886).
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APPENDIX:  STIMULUS MATERIALS
A. Salary Dispute (Labeled “Salary Dispute”; California Judges)
Imagine you are presiding over a bench trial involving an alleged breach of a
written contract.  The plaintiff is an independent consultant working full
time for a small tech company on a series of projects over the course of sev-
eral years. The parties agreed that the firm would pay the plaintiff a fixed
salary that was consistent with the going rate in his profession for the first
year, and then a “fair salary” thereafter.  The company is making a small
profit.  At the time, the industry was experiencing a recession with substantial
unemployment [LOSS:  but the area had no inflation / GAIN: and inflation
of 12%]. There were many other consultants anxious to work at the firm.
The company decided [LOSS: to decrease the salary paid to the plaintiff 7%
/ GAIN to increase the salary paid to the plaintiff only 5%] for the second
year of work.  The plaintiff sued, contending that the salary in the second
year was not a “fair salary.”
Based solely on this information, how would you decide the case?
_____  For the defendant because the [LOSS: 7% reduction / GAIN 5%
increase] is acceptable
_____  For the plaintiff because the {LOSS: 7% reduction / GAIN 5%
increase] is unfair
B. Breach of Contract (Labeled “Contract Dispute”; Minnesota version)
You are presiding over a bench trial involving a contract dispute in
which Jeremy Plains has sued Acme Flooring.  Plains buys older homes, refur-
bishes them, and sells (or “flips”) them quickly.  The dispute arose over a
contract in which Acme promised to install new flooring in a home that that
Plains was about to sell.  The buyers wanted to move into the home without
any further hassles or repairs and offered Plains an extra $20,000 if the floors
were redone to their satisfaction before they moved in.
Plains contracted with Acme to install the flooring for $12,000, which
was to be completed just a few days before the closing.  Acme expected to
earn $1,000 profit from the job, after accounting for the cost of flooring,
other equipment, and labor.  Shortly after accepting the contract with Plains,
however, Acme
[GAIN: was offered another job for a local builder that would earn the com-
pany $2,000 profit (instead of the $1,000 it expected to earn on the job for
Plains) for the same amount of work, but had to be done right away. /
LOSS: encountered an unexpected rise in the price of flooring such that
completing the job would have cost it $1,000 instead of earning it any profit.]
Acme then informed Plains that it was breaking its contract.  Plains sold
the home without the new flooring and therefore did not receive the bonus
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the buyers had offered.  The buyers were upset and posted nasty comments
on several local social media outlets about Plains because the flooring was
not completed in time.
Plains sued Acme for the loss of the bonus and harm to its reputation.
Acme admits that it broke the contract to [GAIN: earn an extra $1,000 from
another job and offers no defense against liability / LOSS: avoid incurring a
loss of $1,000 on the job].  The parties only contest the extent of damages.
Plains requests damages for the lost bonus and damage to his reputation.
Acme contends that Plains might not have received the bonus anyway, as the
flooring had to meet the buyer’s subjective standard and that the harm to
their reputation is minimal at best.  Acme also asserts that Plains could have
found another company to do the job quickly if it had offered more money.
How much should Acme be required to pay Plains?
$___________
C. Mutual Mistake (labeled “Contract Dispute”; Utah judges)
Imagine that you are presiding over a contract dispute.  The plaintiff
and the defendant are both avid collectors of vintage video games.  The
plaintiff is suing to rescind the [SELL: sale of a vintage video game that he
sold to the defendant / BUY:  purchase of a vintage video game that he
bought from the defendant.]
The case actually involves two video games.  One, called “Family Fitness
Stadium Events,” was created in the early 1980’s for the original Nintendo
video game system.  It was made by a long defunct company called Bandai
and has been called the “Holy Grail of video game collectors.”  Only 200
copies of this game were ever sold and its odd, amusing graphics has capti-
vated the imagination of those who collect vintage video games.  It is
extremely rare and worth a great deal.  “Family Fitness” is easily confused
with the other video game at issue in this case, called “Nintendo Fitness,”
which is extremely common and worth very little.
The plaintiff and the defendant both attended a large convention of
collectors who buy and sell vintage video games, comic books, and related
memorabilia in Salt Lake City.  They both rented booths at the convention at
which they offered videos from their collections for sale.  They also bought
items from other collectors at the convention.
[SELL: The plaintiff had placed the game in question among a set of bargain
games, and offered it for sale for $1, as the plaintiff believed it was the com-
mon “Nintendo Fitness” game.  The defendant spotted the game and bought
it on a whim.  The next day, the defendant took the game to an expert and
learned that is the “Family Fitness” game and is worth $38,000.
[BUY:  The defendant had placed the game in question among a set of high-
end games, and offered it for sale for $38,000, as the defendant believed it
was the “Family Fitness” game.  The plaintiff spotted the game and bought it
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on a whim.  The next day, the plaintiff took the game to an expert and
learned that it is the common “Nintendo Fitness” game and is worth only
$1. ]
When the plaintiff learned the true value of the game, he sued to
rescind the transaction.  He contends that the [SELL: sale / BUY: purchase]
of the game was based on a mutual mistake.  Utah courts have adopted the
rule regarding mutual mistake stated in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,
which provides that a contract is voidable when “a mistake of both parties at
the time a contract was made as to a basic assumption on which the contract
was made has a material effect on the agreed exchange of promises.” The
plaintiff contends that neither party understood what the game actually was
and misapprehended the true value of the game, thereby undermining the
basic assumption of the contract.  The defendant asserts that the plaintiff was
taking his chances when selling the game and that at a convention like this, a
deal is a deal and should be enforced.
The parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment and agree
that the only issue is whether the doctrine of mutual mistake entitles the
plaintiff to rescind the contract.  How would you rule on the motions?
[SELL:
___ I would grant the plaintiff’s motion and require the defendant to return
the game
___ I would grant the defendant’s motion and allow him to keep the game
BUY:
___ I would grant the plaintiff’s motion and require the defendant to return
the $38,000
___ I would grant the defendant’s motion and allow him to keep the
$38,000]
D. Employment (Labeled “Employment Discrimination Problem”; Florida Judges)
Imagine that you are presiding in a bench trial of the following employ-
ment discrimination lawsuit.
Frank Porter, a 61-year-old man, filed a complaint with the Florida Com-
mission on Human Relations under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992,
asserting that he was the victim of age discrimination at the hands of
Gatorville College, a small private college.  The Commission, overburdened
with other complaints, failed to investigate the allegations within 180 days of
the complaint, so pursuant to Section 760.11 of the Act, Porter retained
counsel and filed suit against Gatorville College under Section 760.10 of the
Act, which makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate on the basis of
age (and other protected statuses).
The facts presented at trial are as follows.
[HIRE: Porter was one of five applicants for four “Resident Director” posi-
tions at four dormitories at Gatorville College.  All of the applicants held
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similar educational and professional credentials.  The College chose not to
hire Porter, contending that he did not have the interpersonal and staff man-
agement skills of the other applicants.  Porter contends that the real reason
he was not hired is because of his age.  In support of this argument, he points
out that the other four applicants, each of whom was hired, are all under 30,
while he is 61.
[FIRE: Porter was one of five Resident Directors at Gatorville College, which
sought to reduce its Resident Director staff from five to four.  All of the Resi-
dent Directors held similar educational and professional credentials.  The
College chose to discharge Porter, contending that he did not have the inter-
personal and staff management skills of the other Resident Directors.  Porter
contends that the real reason he was discharged is because of his age.  In
support of this argument, he points out that the other four Resident Direc-
tors, each of whom was retained, are all under 30, while he is 61.]
He also produced notes from the central administration supervisor who met
with him.  Next to Porter’s name, the notes read, “Energy?  Understanding of
today’s college students?”
To establish the Defendant’s liability for age discrimination, the Plaintiff
must show that his age was a “substantial or motivating factor” that prompted
the Defendant’s decision [HIRE: not to hire him / FIRE: to fire him.  Based
solely on the facts reported above, would you find for the plaintiff or the
defendant?
Plaintiff Defendant
E. Medical Malpractice  (Labeled “Damages Issue”; American Judges Association
conference version)
Imagine that you are presiding over a bench trial in a medical malprac-
tice case.  The plaintiff, Cliff Roberts, is suing City General Hospital for mal-
practice arising from ocular surgery.  The hospital admits that malpractice
occurred, but you must determine an appropriate damage award.
[FORGEONE GAIN:  Roberts was a skilled welder who suffered severe dam-
age to the retinas in both of his eyes during a freak explosion on a job site
four years earlier.  He has been blind ever since.  Treatment to restore Rob-
erts’ eyesight was not initially available.  Recently, however, the Food and
Drug Administration approved a new artificial retinal implant that would
completely restore his vision.  Roberts underwent surgery to attach the
implant at City General Hospital.  At first, the procedure appeared to go per-
fectly.  Hours later, however, Roberts developed an infection in both eyes.
An inquiry revealed that a nurse had mistakenly brought surgical equipment
into the operating room that had just been used on a patient with a staph
infection.  Roberts remains blind and now has no hope that his sight can be
restored.  The hospital admits that but for the error, the surgery would have
been successful and Roberts would have likely enjoyed normal vision for the
rest of his life. /
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LOSS:  Roberts was a skilled welder suffering from a rare disease that had
begun to cause the retinas in both of his eyes to degenerate slowly.  Although
the disease caused only minor visual impairment (he could still read, drive,
and perform his job adequately), he faced a long-term risk that his vision
would deteriorate.  Treatment to remedy Roberts’ condition was not initially
available.  Recently, however, the Food and Drug Administration approved a
new artificial retinal implant that would eliminate his potential loss of vision.
At first, the procedure appeared to go perfectly.  Hours later, however, Rob-
erts developed an infection in both eyes.  An inquiry revealed that a nurse
had mistakenly brought surgical equipment into the operating room that
had just been used on a patient with a staph infection.  The surgery caused
Roberts to lose his eyesight completely and there is no hope that his sight can
be restored.  The hospital admits that but for the error, the surgery would
have been successful and Roberts would have likely enjoyed normal vision for
the rest of his life.]
Roberts is 34 years old, married, and has two young children (ages 4 and 2).
He continues to hold an office job in the company where he once worked as
a welder.  He has learned to read Braille and, with the aid of a special com-
puter, has mastered basic accounting skills.  He is thus able to support him-
self and his family.  He [FOREGONE GAIN:  will never resume driving /
LOSS: has lost] the ability to drive, of course, and he continues to have diffi-
culty getting around by himself.  He [FOREGONE GAIN:  will never regain /
LOSS: has lost] the ability to engage in his favorite sports and hobbies, which
had included skiing, painting, and tennis.  Roberts has begun psychotherapy
for depression and has had little interest in replacing these activities with
others that he can manage while blind.  He claims that his marriage has also
suffered since the surgery and that he cannot find meaningful ways to engage
with his children.
The hospital has admitted that it is liable for [FOREGONE GAIN: failing to
restore Roberts’ eyesight / LOSS: causing Roberts’ blindness].  It has settled
with him for all economic damages (e.g., loss of potential income, specialized
equipment in his home, and occupational therapy to help Roberts adapt).
The parties could not agree on an amount for Roberts’ lost enjoyment of life.
Roberts asserts that he [FOREGONE GAIN: will never again enjoy / LOSS:
has lost] his favorite hobbies, he is depressed, and his home life [FORE-
GONE GAIN: will never be as it once was when he could see / LOSS:  has
deteriorated since he lost his vision].  The hospital notes that most blind peo-
ple develop interests that do not depend on sight (including forms of skiing).
It also contends that for most people, blindness is not an impediment to a
successful marriage or family life.
Based on these facts, how much would you award Roberts for the lost
enjoyment of life attributable to the hospital negligently [FOREGONE GAIN:
failing to restore his sight / LOSS: causing him to lose his sight?]
$_______________
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F. Water Rights (Labeled “Water Rights”; New Mexico Version)
You are presiding over a case involving water rights.  A large real-estate
developer, Ted Wayne, is challenging a determination by the Office of the
State Engineer (“OSE”), which is charged with managing the State’s Water
Resource Allocation Program.
Most water rights are privately owned and managed under a prior appro-
priation system of recorded rights (earlier recorded water rights trump later
ones).  Water obtained through State and Federal projects, however, is man-
aged through the OSE, and often sold off at deep discounts to encourage
agriculture and development.  These rights, however, are subject to realloca-
tion and readjustment in times of scarcity.
OPTION:  In the most recent auction, Wayne obtained an option to buy
water rights that that the OSE made available for potential use in suburban
Albuquerque.  He has paid nothing yet for the option—he won the auction
by committing to pay the most for the water once the option is exercised.
OWN:  In the most recent auction, Wayne purchased water rights that the
OSE made available for use in suburban Albuquerque.  He won the auction
by paying the most for the water.  The OSE anticipates that these rights will
be available after the construction of a new aqueduct next year, whereupon
Wayne will be able to begin using the water./]
Wayne intends to use the water to support a new, 300-unit residential hous-
ing development with a golf course.  He cannot obtain construction permits
without sufficient water rights and alternative sources will be prohibitively
expensive.
The continuing drought in California, however, has recently caused the
Federal Bureau of Reclamation to reallocate massive amounts of water.  All
Western states have seen reductions in their allocation from Federal projects,
including New Mexico.  The OSE has, in turn, had to reduce available water
allocations.  It has decided that [OPTION:  Wayne will not be able to exercise
his option to purchase his water allocation. / OWN: it is cancelling Wayne’s
water allocation, and his money will be refunded.]
The OSE’s decisions are subject to judicial review, and Wayne has filed
suit.  The OSE’s factual determinates are subject to enormous deference and
Wayne does not challenge them.  Rather, he asserts that it was inappropriate
for the OSE to privilege other uses of water over his proposed residential
development.  He notes that the OSE allowed several large ranches and
farms to retain and even to expand their water consumption.  He also argued
that OSE is undertaking a new project to divert water to in-stream flow to
support trout fishing in a recreational area.  He admits that his planned golf
course would be a heavy user of water, but notes that domestic consumption
accounts for only a tiny fraction of water used state-wide.
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The OSE’s determinations must be based “a reasonable and fair assess-
ment” of the state’s water needs.  Wayne argues that the OSC should not have
privileged other users and thus should not have
[OPTION:  refused to allow him to exercise his option to buy water rights.
The OSC contends that its governing regulation allow it broad discretion to
determine appropriate water uses and that it often must prohibit users from
exercising their options to buy water rights. /
OWN: canceled Wayne’s rights.  The OSC contends that its governing regula-
tion allow it broad discretion to determine appropriate water uses and that it
often must cancels water rights.]
Based on these facts, is your initial impression that OSE’s [OPTION:
refusal to allow Wayne to exercise his option to buy /OWN: decision to can-
cel Wayne’s] water rights is  “reasonable and fair”?
Yes No
G. Products Liability (Labeled “Products Liability Issue” 7th Circuit Judges and
Federal Magistrate Judges)
Imagine that you are a judge are presiding over a bench trial of a prod-
ucts liability lawsuit.  The plaintiffs are numerous foreign nationals who are
suing the manufacturer of a vaccine designed to combat the outbreak of an
unusual strain of Dengue Fever in equatorial countries in Africa.  Assume
that jurisdiction in U.S. Courts is appropriate and that the manufacturer is
liability if the drug design was defective.  Public health officials at the United
Nations concluded that this illness would have killed 600 people before con-
ventional public health programs brought it under control.  Fortunately, a
vaccine was developed quickly.  A United Nations program administered the
vaccine to millions of people in just a few months, thereby quickly containing
the outbreak.
Unfortunately, the vaccine did not save all 600 people from the illness.
The drug company that manufactured the vaccine faced two alternative
designs.  At the time the drug company had to make a choice about the vac-
cine, the estimates of the effect of the vaccines were as follows:
[GAINS:
Vaccine A:  200 people would be saved from the illness
Vaccine B:  1/3 probability that all 600 people would be saved and a 2/3
probability that no one would be saved. /
LOSSES:
Vaccine A:  400 people would die from the illness
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Vaccine B:  1/3 probability that no one would die from the illness and a 2/3
probability that all 600 would die from the illness.]
The drug company chose vaccine A without disclosing the alternative
design to public health officials.  This lawsuit arises from the death of several
people who took the vaccine and nevertheless died from the illness.  The
plaintiffs alleged that the choice of design was unreasonable, rendering the
drug defective. They contend that the drug company should have used vac-
cine B, arguing that the alternative design [GAINS:  could have saved 400
more people. /LOSSES: left 400 people to die from the illness.]  Public
health experts disagree on which vaccine was appropriate.
Liability turns on the issue of whether the drug company made the rea-
sonable choice when selecting vaccine A.  What is your opinion?
 ____ Vaccine A was the appropriate choice
 ____ Vaccine B was the appropriate choice
H. Bankruptcy (Labeled, “Choice Among Reorganization Plans”;
Bankruptcy Judges)
You are presiding over a Chapter 11 reorganization of a small business,
“Hammer Time, Inc.” Hammer Time is a home supply and service business
consisting of a hardware store, a carpet shop, and a contracting business.
Hammer Time’s contracting work is profitable, but the hardware store and
carpet shop are failing.  Several months ago, Hammer Time filed for protec-
tion and reorganization under Chapter 11.  Hammer Time listed debts owed
to suppliers, utilities, landlords, companies from whom it has rented con-
struction equipment, and several sub-contractors.  Hammer Time listed
assets such as inventory, office furniture, and construction equipment. It has
several construction contracts underway that would earn it revenue if it con-
tinued as a going concern.  An immediate liquidation would leave the
unsecured creditors with $600,000 less than they are owed.
You are conducting a confirmation hearing.  Two competing plans for
reorganization have been offered by the unsecured creditors:  Plan A and
Plan B.  Each has received a comparable level of support from the unsecured
creditors, but neither has attracted support from holders of two-thirds of the
unsecured debt, as required by 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c).  Both plans, however,
satisfy the other requirements for confirmation.  All of the secured creditors
have agreed to accept either plan.  Under these circumstances, pursuant to
11 U.S.C. § 1129(c), you must “consider the preferences of creditors” and
confirm one of the two plans.
Which plan would you choose?
GAINS:
_____  If you select Plan A, $200,000 of the unsecured debt will be paid for
sure
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_____ If you select Plan B, there is a 1/3 probability that all of the unsecured
debt will be paid and a 2/3 chance that none of it will be paid.
LOSSES:
_____  If you select Plan A, $400,000 of the unsecured debt will remain
unpaid for sure
_____ If you select Plan B, there is a 1/3 probability that none of the
unsecured debt will remain unpaid and a 2/3 probability that all of the
unsecured debt will remain unpaid
